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The current investigation is a test of the vigilance-avoidance model of attentional 
processing in a socially anxious sample (Mogg, Bradley, de Bono, & Painter, 1997). The 
theory proposes that individuals with social phobia possess a pre-attentive bias for social 
threat cues in their environment, however, they subsequently fail to process this 
information due to strategic cognitive avoidance, that is, conscious efforts to disengage 
attention fiom threatening information. A c o m b i  subliminaVsupraliminal emotional 
Stroop paradigm was employed in order to examine patterns of pre-attentive and 
attentional processing of threat cues in an analogue sample of undergraduate students with 
high versus low levels of social anxiety. Attentional patterns were assessed both prior to 
and &er the initiation of an anxiety induction procedure. It was predicted that, when 
subjected to stress, socially anxious individuals would iwtomatically orient their attention 
to social threat cues, however, they would not maintain their attentional focus on the cues 
sufficiently to allow objective evaluation of them. Thus, theoretically, habituation to the 
anxiety produced by the social threat cues would be prevented and anxiety would be 
maintained over the long term. 
Socially anxious individuals demonstrated pre-attentive vigilance for both social 
and physical threat cues, followed by avoidance of such cues in later, voluntary stages of 
attention (ie., the vigilance-avoidance pattern) in the absence of stress. However, when 
subjected to an anxiety induction procedure, the attentional pattern of the socially anxious 
individuals was altered. The initial pre-attentive vigilance for threat appeared to continue 
into later, strategic stages of attention. That is, they did not appear to be capable of 
overriding their preattentive bias for threat and attention remained engaged on the threat 
cues. Contrastingly, under stress, the non-anxious control group demonstrated a pattern 
of avoidance of threat cues in preattentive and attentional stages. These hdings are 
discussed in light of the vigilance-avoidance model and another recently-proposed theory 
of attentional bias (Fox et al., 2001,2002). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Cognitive processing models of psychopathology have proposed that individuals 
who suffer Erom anxiety disorders exhibit a tendency to process preferentially threatening 
information in their environment (Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997). In 
social phobia, this processing bias is specific for social threat cues and has been 
demonstrated for attention and interpretation, but not for memory (Amir et al., 1996; Foa, 
Franklin, Perry, & Herbert, 1996; Rapee, McCdum, & Melville, 1994). According to 
Williams and colleagues (1997), anxiety is characterized by a bias that favors threat stimuli 
in both pre-attentive (i.e., prior to awareness) and attentional (i.e., subject to strategic 
control) processes. Moreover, the pre-attentive vigilance for threat is hypothesized to 
represent a cognitive vulnerabiity W o r  for clinical anxiety. 
Williams and colleagues (1997) have suggested that what distinguishes non- 
clinically anxious Erom clinically anxious individuals is their abiity to "override7' their 
attentional bias in times of stress. However, recent investigations have demonstrated that 
strategic override is not limited to the non-clinically anxious (Amir et al., 1996; Mathews 
& Sebastian, 1993). In particular, initial data suggest that, when faced with stress, 
individuals with social phobia are able to suppress their attentional bias for socially 
threatening information, suggesting that they are particularly adept at avoidance. 
Recently, a two-stage, vigilance-avoidance cognitive processing model has been 
outlined which would appear both to explain recent discrepant findings and to elucidate 
the maintenance of clinically significant anxiety (Mogg, Bradley, de Bono, & Painter, 
1997). The authors posit that individuals with social phobia possess a pre-attentive bias 
for social threat cues in their environment, however, they subsequently fail to process this 
information due to strategic cognitive avoidance, that is, conscious efforts to avoid 
attending to threatening information. Avoidance of the processing of social threat cues 
prevents habituation, or objective evaluation, of such information. As a result, the 
threatening information retains its anxiety-provoking effects. 
The current study is a test of the vigilance-avoidance hypothesis in a socially 
anxious analogue sample. A variant of MacLeod and Hagan's (1992) subliminal Stroop 
color-naming paradigm was employed in order to examine patterns of pre-attentive and 
attentional processing of threat cues in undergraduate students with and without 
significant levels of social anxiety. Moreover, by examining these attentional patterns 
prior to and subsequent to an anxiety induction procedure, the study aimed to elucidate 
whether these patterns change as a hnction of the degree of situational stress that an 
individual experiences. 
Social Phobia: Descriptive Psychopathologv 
Social phobia was once labeled the "neglected anxiety disorder" because it had 
received less empirical study than other anxiety disorders (e-g., panic disorder, 
agoraphobia, specific phobia). However, the past ten to twenty years have seen a 
dramatic increase in research with respect to the etiology and treatment of social phobia. 
Tfris interest has been due, in part, to the recognition that the disorder represents a 
significant mental health problem affecting approximately 13% of the general population at 
some point in their lifetime (Kessler et al., 1994). 
According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-Fourth 
Edition, the hallmark of social phobia is a marked and persistent fear of one or more social 
or performance situations in which a person is exposed to unfamiliar people or to possible 
scrutiny by others (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Individuals who suffer ftom 
social phobia fear critical evaluation from others and perceive a high likelihood of being 
disapproved of or humiliated as a result of social scrutiny. As a result, they frequently 
avoid social situations or endure them with a great degree of emotional or somatic 
distress. Social anxiety may be limited to a circumscribed area (i.e., public speaking), in 
which cape it is referred to as speciiic subtype, or it may be pervasive and extend across a 
variety of situations, in which case it is referred to as generalized subtype (APA, 1994). 
Social phobia is associated with significant comorbidity and impairment in quality 
of life. For example, Turner, Beidel, Borden, Stanley, and Jacob (1 99 1) found that 43% 
of a sample of 71 individuals diagnosed with social phobia received an additional Axis I 
diagnosis (GAD was most common). Another study found that 60% of a sample of 
individuals with social phobia had an additional Axis I diagnosis, with speclfic phobia 
(25%), dysthymia (2 I%), and avoidant personality disorder (1 7%) being the most 
common comorbid diagnoses (Sanderson, DiNardo, Rapee, & Barlow, 1990). Alcohol 
and substance abuse are also common comorbid conditions that may represent attempts by 
individuals to alleviate anxiety through self-medication. One study reported that 19% of a 
community sample of individuals with social phobia met criteria for alcohol abuse 
(Schneier, Johnson, Hornig, Liebowitz, & Wissrnan, 1992). In addition, mood disorders 
are another common comorbid condition, with approximately one-third of social phobics 
meeting criteria for depression (Liebowitz, Gorman, Fyer, & Klein, 1985). 
Historically, there has been some codhion in the literature about the nature of the 
relationship between social phobia and avoidant personality disorder (APD). APD is a 
long-standiig pattern of avoidance of interpersonal contact, fear of rejection, fear of 
blushing, or concerns about performing inadequately in social encounters (APA, 1994). 
According to Johnson and Lydiard (1995) approximately 40-70% of social phobics 
receive an additional diagnosis of APD. The two disorders share a similar age of onset, 
although those who suffer fiom APD are more likely to have comorbid depression. Thus, 
some researchers hypothesize that the two disorders differ quantitatively, not qualitatively. 
Social phobia is also associated with significant impairment in educational, 
occupational, and social finctioning. Individuals with social phobia fiequently avoid 
occupations which require social contact, pass up opportunities for higher education, and 
fail to develop fiendships and relationships outside of their immediate family (Ross, 
1994). The disorder is equally prevalent in men and women, and age of onset is generally 
between 15 and 20 years (Liebowitz et al., 1985; Turner, B i d e l &  Townsley, 1992). In 
one study of individuals with social phobia, the mean age of participants seeking treatment 
ranged fiom 27 to 41 years, with duration of illness ranging fiom 8 to 22 years (Heimberg, 
1989). Thus, although onset of social phobia is early relative to the other anxiety 
disorders, treatment-seeking behavior is not. 
Etiolonical Models of Social Phobia 
Social Skills Deficit Model. Early conceptualizations of social phobia were 
grounded on the belief that afflicted individuals lacked the social skills necessary to engage 
in successfil social interactions (Curran, 1977; Twentyman & McFall, 1975). According 
to social skills models, individuals who lack social skills find social interaction particularly 
aversive, prompting them to avoid social situations and to experience fewer opportunities 
to increase their repertoire of social behavior. Research on whether individuals with 
social phobia do, in fact, perform more poorly in social evaluative situations than do non- 
anxious participants has been far from consistent. Whereas some studies have found 
socially anxious participants to score lower on independent ratings of social performance 
(Pilkonis, 1977; Twentyman & McFall, 1975), others have not found significant 
differences (Clark & Arkowitz, 1975; Glasgow & Arkowitz, 1975; Rapee & Lim, 1992). 
Treatments which spawned from these early conceptualizations of social phobia 
focused on the development of social skills through the use of instruction, participant 
modeling, corrective feedback, and role playing. However, research evaluating the 
effectiveness of social skills training for social anxiety has demonstrated only modest 
outcome effects. In an early study, systematic desensitization (progressive relaxation 
training with the presentation of increasingly anxiety-provoking imaginal scenes) was 
compared to social skills training for social anxiety. Neither treatment demonstrated 
effects clearly superior to attention placebo controls (Marzillier, Lambert, and Kellett, 
1976). Similarly, a follow-up study comparing individuals with social phobia with and 
without social skills deficits found that both groups improved equally with either 
treatment, however, improvement was restricted to self-report of anxiety rather than 
behavioral change (Trower, Yardley, Bryant, & Shaw, 1978). Another study found that 
individuals with social phobia who were treated with either social skills training alone or in 
combination with cognitive modification (a treatment based on Ellis's Rational Emotive 
Therapy) found that both groups demonstrated modest improvement on measures of 
social interaction, anxiety, depression, and irrational beliefs (Stravynski, Marks, & Yule, 
1982). Given inconsistent empirical findings with respect to the existence of social skills 
deficits in social phobics and the success of social skills training in alleviating anxiety, the 
social skills model would appear to an incomplete explanation for the development and 
maintenance of social phobia. 
Conditioning Models. One of the most prominent theories of social phobia 
proposes that it may develop in the same way as many specific phobias, that is, as a result 
of one or more traumatic conditioning experiences. For example, social situations (e.g., 
public speaking or eating in public) become conditioned stimuli (CS) in that they acquire 
the capacity to elicit fear after being paired with an unconditioned stimulus (UCS) such as 
social defeat or a humiliating experience. Consistent with this theory, one study found 
that 58% of a sample of individuals diagnosed with social phobia could recall a direct 
conditioning experience that may have been involved in the onset of social anxiety (Ost & 
Hugdahl, 1981). After the social fear is classically conditioned, Two Factor Theory posits 
that subsequent avoidance behavior develops through operant learning (Mower, 1960). 
That is, avoidance of both the aversive social situation and the physiological arousal that it 
produces becomes negatively reinforcing. 
Social fears also may be acquired through observational or vicarious conditioning. 
Although there is little empirical evidence for this theory in humans, strong empirical 
support exists for the observational conditioning of phobiolike fears in animals. For 
example, laboratory-raised monkeys who have never been exposed to snakes acquire an 
intense fear of them after obseiving wild monkeys behaving f d l y  in their presence 
(Mineka & Cook, 1993). Although this evidence is indirect, it at least offers some support 
for the notion that the vicarious learning of social fears is feasible in humans. 
Early exposure-based therapies developed from conditioning models, which 
predicted that repeated exposure to feared stimuli would result in extinction of the 
conditioned fear response. Typically, an exposure experience involves the drafting of a list 
of anxiety provoking situations, afier which a therapist and a client progress up the list, 
sometimes aided by relaxation therapy, until each situation is adequately tolerated by the 
client. In this way, the client learns to participate in social situations with reduced anxiety. 
Homework assignments also require clients to practice exposing themselves to a variety of 
feared social situations in order to gain valuable experience with feared social situations 
and to develop a sense of social competence and increased amenability to entering social 
situations. 
Empirical testing of exposure therapy has produced promising results. For 
example, in a study comparing rational-emotive therapy (RET) and self-instructional 
training (SIT) to exposure therapy @rnrnelkamp, Mersch, Vissia, Van der Helm, 1985), 
only exposure therapy resulted in a significant reduction in social anxiety and significantly 
greater reductions in heart rate before and after a behavioral test compared to the other 
two treatments. When group-administered exposure was compared to individual social 
skills training (SST), both interventions produced significant within-group changes on 
measures of social fear and avoidance (Wlazlo, Schroeder-Hartwig, Hand, Kaiser, & 
Munchau, 1990). However, exposure therapy resulted in a greater reduction of fear of 
social contact and greater gains in assertiveness than did SST. 
Despite the success of exposure-based treatments for social phobia, the 
conditioning models upon which they are based have weaknesses as etiological models. 
Fist, not all individuals with social phobia can recall experiencing or witnessing a 
traumatic event that could account for their classically conditioned fear response to social 
situations (Ost & Hugdahl, 198 1). Second, many individuals who experience social 
humiliation fail to develop lasting fears of social situations. Third, historically, conditioned 
fear has been very difficult to produce experimentally in humans (Harris, 1979). These 
and other difficulties have prompted researchers to explore cognitive factors in an attempt 
to explain the origin and maintenance of social phobia. 
Cognitive Models. In general, cognitive theories of anxiety disorders focus both 
on the content of cognitions and on the information processing strategies and cognitive 
structures that support anxious hnctioning. According to Beck and Emery's (1985) 
cognitive model anxiety disorders result from "hypersensitive alarm systems.. . sensitive to 
any stimuli that might be taken as indicating imminent disaster or harm" (p. 3 1). This 
hypersensitivity is characterized by a style of cognitive processing known as the 
"vulnerability mode," which facilitates the processing of danger or threat cues. According 
to the cognitive model, a mode represents an organization of cognitive structures called 
schemata, or rules based on experience, which "orient the individual to a situation and help 
him [her] to select relevant details fiom the environment and to recall relevant data7' (p. 
54). According to the cognitive model, the vulnerability mode, which is predominant in 
those who suffer with anxiety disorders, involves the activation of dyshnctional schemata 
which are hypersensitive to threat cues and hyposensitive to safety cues. 
According to the cognitive model individuals who are afflicted with anxiety 
disorders are thought to process information in a biased manner as a result of 
dysfunctional schemata (Beck & Emery, 1985). For example, the schemata of individuals 
with panic disorder render them particularly vulnerable to physical threat and elicit 
increased vigilance to changes in bodily sensations (e.g., increases in heart rate or 
respiration, chest pain, dizziiess). Individuals who suffer fiom social phobia, on the other 
hand, possess schemata which render them particularly vulnerable to negative evaluation 
fi-om others. In response to threatening social situations, their vulnerability mode becomes 
active and their schemata define them as incompetent or lacking the resources to meet 
social demands. As a result, individuals with social phobia interpret social situations as 
challenges or confiontations in which they are at risk of revealing signs of vulnerability or 
weakness. These individuals scan their environment for threat-related material and 
allocate more resources to its processiig. Although schematic hypersensitivity to threat 
cues is meant to protect the socially anxious fi-om the perceived hazards of social 
interaction, it results in an overestimation of their vulnerability and confirms their 
expectations of negative evaluation. 
Clearly, one disadvantage of cognitive models is that they include inferential, 
higher-order constructs (e.g., schemata) which can only be measured indirectly. However, 
two important criteria by which a construct may be evaluated are its ability to hrther our 
understanding of a disorder and to generate clinical interventions. Cognitive factors have 
been hypothesized to be more central to the development and maintenance of social 
phobia than is the case with any other anxiety disorder (Butler, 1985; Ernrnelkamp, 1982). 
At its very core, fear of negative evaluation by others is a problem of the perception of 
other people's motives and behavior. Thus, interventions that address distorted thoughts 
and perceptions should be especially important components of the treatment of social 
phobia. Indeed, research has suggested that individuals with social phobia who receive 
exposure-based treatment with cognitive restructuring tend to be more successfid in 
maintaining treatment gains than are individuals who receive exposure treatment by itself 
(Mattick et al., 1989; 1991). 
Beck and Emery's mode1 (1985) also has been successfid in generating a great deal 
of research into the development and maintenance of anxiety disorders. Consistent with 
cognitive conceptualizations of attentional processes in clinical populations, several studies 
have confirmed that clinically anxious individuals do, in fact, process information 
differently than do non-clinical populations. Although these information-processing 
studies span the varied domains of interpretation, attention, memory, and interoception, 
for the purposes of the present research proposal, the succeeding review will be limited to 
the domain of attentional bias. 
Attentional Bias in Social Phobia 
Attentional bias refers to an individual's tendency, given limited information- 
processing capacity, to selectively allocate attentional resources to particular stimuli in 
hidher environment. The ability to detect signs of threat in one's environment, in 
particular, would appear to have adaptive value, in that it would allow one to prepare for 
defensive action. However, individuals who suffer fiom anxiety disorders are thought to 
possess a particularly low threshold for detecting threat. As a result, they misinterpret 
harmless situations as potentially threatening and quickly shift into a defensive mode 
characterized by increased physiological arousal and behavioral avoidance. A number of 
investigations have utilized detection, Gicilitation, and interference paradigms to examine 
attentional bias in the anxiety disorders, in general, and in the socially anxious, in 
particular (McNally, 19%). 
Detection Paradimns. Detection paradigms are designed to assess an individual's 
propensity to shift attentional resources to threatening information while hdshe is engaged 
in another task. For example, the dichotic listening task requires a participant to attend to 
one of two passages being presented to opposite ears while performing a response when 
specific target words occur in the unattended passage. In the past, the dichotic listening 
task has been adapted for a sample of agoraphobics, social phobics, and controls (Burgess, 
Jones, Robertson, RadclifFe, & Emerson, 198 1). Participants repeated aloud (shadowed) 
one of two passages presented to opposite ears. They were required to push a button 
whenever they detected threat (e.g., shopping alone) and neutral (e.g., pick) targets that 
occurred out of context in either passage. Both clinical groups detected s i ~ c a n t l y  more 
threat targets than neutral targets in the unattended passage. Thus, the clinical groups, but 
not the control group, exhibited an attentional bias for threat. 
Facilitation Paradi-ms. If threat cues do, in fact, command attentional resources in 
social anxiety, then such cues would be expected to facilitate performance on tasks that 
require attentional shifts to threat cues. This premise lies behind facilitation paradigms 
such as the dot-probe attention deployment task. The traditional dot-probe task requires 
participants to perform a response (e.g., a button press) to a neutral visual stimulus (e.g., a 
dot) which replaces either member of a pair of words that appear on a computer screen. 
Participants read the top word of each pair and press a button whenever they detect a dot. 
In a typical study, on a proportion of trials, one of the two words has a threatening 
meaning. For example, performing the dot-probe task, clients with generalized social 
phobia responded b t e r  to probes (i.e., dots) that followed social threat words than to 
probes that followed either neutral or physical threat words (Asmundson & Stein, 1994). 
An earlier study had found that individuals with panic disorder responded faster to probes 
that followed physical threat words than to probes that replaced social threat words 
(Asmundson, Sandler, Wilson, & Walker, 1992). However, a more recent study failed to 
replicate those findings (Horenstein & Segui, 1997). In this recent study, responses of 
individuals with social phobia and panic disorder were compared to control on a dot-probe 
task consisting of social threat, physical threat, and neutral words. Although individuals 
with panic disorder responded significantly faster to words denoting physical threat, the 
same pattern of results was not observed with respect to individuals with social phobia and 
social threat words. 
Believing that social threat words did not possess sufficient threat value for 
individuals with social phobia, Yuen (1994) modified the dot-probe task, using neutral and 
negative facial expressions rather than words. Participants were presented with two faces, 
one above the other, for one second. The faces were then replaced with a dot that 
appeared on the location of the top or bottom face. Analyses revealed that highly socially 
anxious individuals showed longer reaction times for detecting dots that appeared on a site 
of a previously presented negative face, as compared to a neutral face. There were no 
significant differences found in reaction times for nonanxious individuals. Thus, these 
hdings are at odds with the attentional bias hypothesis, which would predict that 
individuals with social anxiety will exhibit shorter reaction times for negative faces. 
The LLface-in-the-crowd" task represents another type of facilitation paradigm. 
Using stimuli consisting of facial expressions may represent a more ecologically valid 
means of investigating cognitive bias in individuals with social phobia for several reasons. 
For example, facial expressions of anger or disapproval connote negative social 
evaluation, which is a highly salient concern for social phobics. In addition, the detection 
of facial features and expressions is extremely efficient, operates on a preattentive level, 
and appears early in human development, suggesting that it is of particular evolutionary 
sigdicance (Ekrnan, 1992; Hansen & Hansen, 1994; Ohman, 1986; Young & Ellis, 1989). 
In the face-in-the-crowd task, participants are presented with computer-generated images 
of a "crowd" consisting of twelve faces. In some trials all faces have identical emotional 
expressions, whereas on others one "targetn face displays a different emotion than the rest 
(the "distractors"). The task of the participant is to report either the presence or location 
of the target face. 
Consistent with the attentional bias hypothesis, individuals with social phobia are 
significantly faster to detect angry than happy faces within a neutral crowd (Schechtman, 
Foa, & Amir, 1999). When attempting to detect a target face, social phobics are 
sigdicantly more impaired by the presence of both angry and happy crowds, implying a 
sensitivity for emotional expression in general. Inconsistent with the attentional bias 
hypothesis, however, both clinical and control groups have been shown to allocate 
disproportionate attention to angry faces which are presented in a background of happy 
faces (Schechtman et al., 1999). In summary, findings from the dot-probe and the face-in- 
a-crowd paradigms would appear to offer mixed support for Beck and Emery's assertion 
that social phobics are unique in their propensity to attend to social threat cues. 
Interference Paradims. A third approach to investigating attentional bias, the 
interference paradigm, requires participants to ignore extraneous stimuli while performing 
a task which is unrelated to the detection of threat. Selective attention to threat is 
suggested by task performance decrements induced by the presence of threat cues. To 
date, interference paradigms, particularly the Stroop color-naming task (Stroop, 1935), 
have received the most empirical attention of the three methods of studying attentional 
biases. In the original Stroop task, participants are shown a series of color words ("blue," 
"green," "yellow") on cards or on a computer screen. The participant is required to name 
the color in which each word is printed. The modified emotional Stroop task involves 
using emotionally laden words rather than color words. Efficient color-naming 
necessitates that the participant ignore the meaning of the word, despite the fact that 
words vary in emotional valence. When a participant exhibits delays in color-naming 
certain classes of words (e.g., highly emotional), "Stroop  interference"^ said to occur. In 
such a case, a participant's attention is drawn to the meaning of the word, resulting in a 
slowed reaction time to color-name the word. According to Beck and Emery's (1985) 
cognitive theory, anxious patients, who exhibit an attentional bias for threatening stimuli, 
should take longer to name the colors of threat words than to name the colors of non- 
threat words. 
Several studies have examined the performance of socially anxious samples on the 
emotional Stroop task. The first study compared the response times of individuals with 
social phobia and panic disorder to color-name sets of neutral, social threat, and physical 
threat words (Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, & Dombeck, 1990). Social threat words were 
chosen to evoke selfdescriptive constructs (e.g., inadequate, inferior) or to describe 
socially anxious individuals' expectations for their performance in social situations (e.g., 
criticized, failure). Similarly, physical threat words were chosen to reflect the theorized 
schemata of individuals with panic disorder and thus reflected vulnerability to physical 
threat (e-g., stroke, hospital, fatal, insane). Both the social and physical threat words were 
matched with neutral words which were similar in number of letters, number of syllables, 
and frequency of occurrence in the language (Caroll, Davies, & Richman, 1971). In 
addition, a fifth control set consisted of words denoting color names and groups of five 
Xs. The words and the colors of the words were presented randomly on six cards, with 
the restrictions that no one word would appear sequentially or more than twice in one row 
or column. Participants also completed written measures of verbal ability, mood, and 
phobic avoidance. 
As the researchers had hypothesized, individuals with social phobia, but not panic 
disorder, took longer to color-name social threat words than matched control words. In 
contrast, individuals with panic disorder, but not social phobia, showed longer latencies to 
color name threat words than matched controls. According to the researchers, despite 
instructions to the contrary, both clinical groups allocated more processing resources to 
information which was consistent with their schemata. Outside of the laboratory, such a 
tendency might result in the socially anxious individual's tendency to disproportionately 
attend to negative cues during the course of social interaction, confirming hidher self- 
concept as an inept social communicator. The study also found a correlation between 
social threat interference (a difference score between interference on control and social 
threat words) and self-reported social avoidance. The researchers hypothesized that their 
index of social threat interference may be a gauge of how vulnerable individuals perceive 
themselves to be in social situations (Hope et al., 1990). 
This study (Hope et al., 1990), however, suffers fiom a number of methodological 
limitations. First, because social and physical threat words were matched for length and 
fiequency of use to control sets, but not to each other, latencies for the two sets of threat 
words could not be directly compared. Second, a question still remains as to whether 
schemata need to be activated before they influence information processing. The authors 
theorized that schemas likely were activated by the treatment setting in which the 
experiment took place. Third, the authors speculated that their use of a standardized set of 
stimuli, versus one which is tailored to an individual social phobic's primary concerns, may 
have resulted in smaller effect sizes. Because social phobics are a heterogeneous group 
who often use idiosyncratic language to describe their social fears, the use of 
individualized stimulus words may be more effective in activating their self-schemata and, 
in turn, in causing greater interference on the Stroop task. 
A recent study failed to replicate the Hope and colleagues' (1990) hdings 
(Niekerk, Moller, & Nortje, 1999). Participants were individuals with DSM-III-R (APA, 
1987) diagnosed social phobia and panic disorder. Because a proportion of participants 
were Afrikaans-speaking, a separate Stroop task consisting of translations of Hope and 
colleagues' (1990) word sets had to be constructed. Unfortunately, data analyses failed to 
reveal significant differences in color-naming latencies between the physical or social 
threat words and their corresponding control words for either the social phobia or panic 
disorder group. In explaining their null findings, the authors proposed that recent 
completion of psychotherapy and concurrent phannacotherapy received by a large 
proportion of their sample had contributed to an attenuation of the traditionally-observed 
schema-priming effects of the threat words. 
Although the Stroop performance of social phobics had been compared to that of 
panic disorder patients, a later study contrasted the Stroop task performance of individuals 
with DSM-HI-R (APA, 1987) diagnosed social phobia to a matched sample of community 
volunteers (Mattia, Heimberg, & Hope, 1993). Although individuals with social phobia 
were slower to color-name all word types than were community controls, they were 
especially disrupted by social threat wods. Thus, it appears that individuals with social 
phobia, in comparison to those with panic disorder (Hope et al., 1990) and community 
controls, have a distinct pattern of response to social stimuli. The authors speculated that 
the general slowing on the Stroop task exhibited by individuals with social phobia may be 
due to social-evaluative anxiety produced by the task itself, the environment (a treatment 
clinic), and the presence of the experimenter. 
According to Beck and Emery's (1985) theory, increased self-focus should 
activate the dysfunctional schema of persons with social phobia, resulting in increased 
selective attention for social threat. Lundh and Ost (1996) sought to test this assumption 
by experimentally inducing self-focus with a mirror present in the room in which the 
Stroop task was performed. Individuals with DSM-III-R (APA, 1987) diagnosed social 
phobia and matched controls were randomly assigned to either the mirror or no mirror 
condition. All participants completed a computer generated Stroop task, consisting of 
two threat word categories (social and physical), two matched neutral sets, a color word 
set, and a set of Xs. Each category of words was presented on a separate stimulus screen 
and the six stimulus screens were randomly ordered for each participant. 
Consistent with previous research (Mattia et al., 1993), the researchers observed a 
Stroop interference effect for social threat words, but not for physical threat or color 
words. However, this interference effect was not significantly enhanced by the presence 
of the mirror. The authors speculated that the presence of a mirror may not have been 
sufficient to produce enhanced self-focus. They suggested that future studies examine the 
effects of having a camera in the room with participants, because this manipulation 
previously has been found to induce self-focus in normal participants (Geller & Shaver, 
1976). An alternative explanation is that the presence of the mirror may have been 
successfil in enhancing self-focus, but that this condition did not affect participants' 
performance on the Stroop. Because no measure of self-awareness was taken during 
testing, it is difficult to determine which possibility accounted for the absence of enhanced 
Stroop interference effects. 
According to Beck and Emery's (1985) theory, anxious individuals allocate 
disproportionate attentional resources specifically to threat-related cues in their 
environment. However, Maidenberg and colleagues questioned whether Stroop 
interference effects represented a tendency for anxious individuals to attend to emotional 
stimuli in general (Maidenberg, Chen, Craske, Bohn, and Bystritsky, 1996). Individuals 
with panic disorder and social phobia, and controls completed a computerized Stroop task 
including neutral, positive, and threatening words related to panic, social concerns, and 
general concerns. Words were drawn randomly fiom each category and were displayed 
individually in the center of the computer screen. A voice-activated relay recorded 
response latency to color name each word. 
As evidenced by longer response times to all types of threatening words (social, 
physical, and general) individuals with panic disorder in this study displayed a generality to 
their attentional bias. In contrast, individuals with social phobia exhibited a specificity to 
their attentional bias, as evidenced by longer response times to social threat, as compared 
to neutral words. Positively valenced words did not produce interference effects in any of 
the groups. The researchers hypothesized that individuals with panic disorder may possess 
a broader fear network, such that a wide range of threat stimuli capture their attention. 
Lang (1985) has previously suggested that fear networks of anxiety patients exist on a 
continuum, fiom the cohesive network of individuals with specific phobias, to the less 
cohesive networks of panic disorder and generalized anxiety disorder patients. This 
assertion is consistent with previous research by Barlow and colleagues which suggests 
that a wide range of environmental stimuli elicit physiological arousal in individuals with 
panic disorder (Barlow et al., 1985). Such arousal is cognitively misinterpreted as 
dangerous, resulting in the onset of a panic attack (Barlow, 1988). The fear network of an 
individual with social phobia, on the other hand, would lie somewhere between that of a 
person with specific phobia and panic disorder and would be activated by a more restricted 
range of threat stimuli pertaining to social-evaluative concerns. 
In the face of increasing evidence of an anxiety-specific attentional bias for threat, 
the validity of the Stroop task as a measure of selective attention has been challenged. 
Holle, Neely, and Heirnberg (1997) recently speculated that increased latencies to color- 
name threat words could be a by-product of the manner in which the words are presented. 
Indeed, all previous investigations of Stroop effects in social phobia (with the exception of 
the aforementioned Maidenberg et al. study) had presented each word category in a 
"blocked" format. That is, words of the same type (e.g., social threat) appeared together 
on a single card or computer screen and were read sequentially by the participant. The 
theorized problem with this presentation format is that interference effects for threat 
words may not solely be the result of attentional bias, but of rumination over the meaning 
of previously presented threat words, or semantic priming effects (Foa, Feske, Murdock, 
Kozak, & McCarthy, 1991). Thus, Stroop interference effects on individual threat words 
may represent a "spillover" of the effects of previously presented words onto responses to 
subsequent words (Holle et al., 1997). 
The effects of presentation format on color-naming of social threat words by social 
phobics has also been investigated (Holle et al., 1997). Individuals with previously 
diagnosed social phobia @SM-IZI-R, APA, 1987) completed two sequential versions of 
the Stroop task. One version presented words in a blocked format (all words of one 
category type were presented sequentially), whereas the other version presented words in 
a random format (words were taken at random fiom all of the categories). The 
experimental design ensured that the presentation order of the two versions of the Stroop 
task was counterbalanced. Three categories of stimulus words were utilized: social threat 
words, semantically-related neutral words (animal names) and unrelated neutral words. 
Unlike previous Stroop investigations, words were presented individually in the center of a 
computer screen and reaction time to color-name them was recorded via a voice-activated 
relay attached to a microphone headset. 
Although individuals with social phobia showed increased latencies for color- 
naming social threat words in comparison to neutral words, these differences in color- 
naming were found only for the stimuli presented in the blocked format. Interestingly, the 
magnitude of the color-naming latency difference for social threat versus neutral words 
found in the blocked format also was influenced by whether the neutral words were 
semantically related. Thus, this study underscores the importance of moddjmg the Stroop 
format in order to control for semantic priming effects. The effects of semantic priming 
may be controlled by presenting words fiom various categories randomly and individually, 
as opposed to massed presentation. Also, control word sets should be matched to 
stimulus word sets for semantic relatedness. 
In summary, results obtained fiom studies using the emotional Stroop task provide 
moderate support for Beck and Emery's (1985) model, which predicts that anxiety 
disorders should be characterized by a processing selectivity for threat-related information. 
With respect to the validity of the Stroop as a measure of selective attention, the study by 
Holle and colleagues (1997) highlights the importance of modifjing traditional Stroop 
procedures to control for the confounding effects of semantic priming. The one study of 
individuals with social phobia which controlled for these effects still found significant 
Stroop intefierence for social threat words (Maidenberg et al., 1996). Moreover, studies 
of color-naming in individuals with other anxiety disorders have continued to find 
significant differences in response latencies for threat words when words of all categories 
are presented in a random format (Foa et al, 1991; McNally, Riemann, Louro, Lukach, & 
Kim, 1992). Thus, it appears that threat value, and not semantic priming effects, accounts 
for a significant proportion of Stroop intefierence effects on social threat words. 
Automatic versus Strategic Processing: The Failure of Beck and Emery's (1985) Model 
The cognitive model proposed by Beck and Emery (1985) would predict that both 
anxiety and depression should be characterized by processing biases, with anxious 
individuals favoring the processing of threat-related information, and depressed individuals 
hvoring the processing of depressogenic material. Theoretically, such biases should be 
reflected in performance on tasks assessing various stages of cognitive processing, 
including attention, encoding, and memory. However, a comparison of empirical studies 
of cognitive biases associated with the two disorders reveals that the patterns of 
processing associated with anxiety appear to differ significantly fiom those associated with 
depression. In particular, anxious individuals appear to selectively encode more 
emotionally-negative aspects of their environment, even when they are instructed to avoid 
encoding such material or when they are unaware that such stimuli are present. Moreover, 
they show enhanced implicit memory for negatively valenced information, yet do not show 
such a bias in explicit, or intentional, memory tasks such as recall (e-g., Mogg, Mathews, 
& Weinman, 1987). In general, these findings suggest that anxiety is associated with 
cognitive biases which operate at an automatic level of processing, without volition and 
operating outside of conscious awareness (MacLeod & Rutherford, 1998). 
Individuals suffering with depression, on the other hand, do not exhibit a selective 
processing bias for negatively valenced material (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986). 
Nor do they show enhanced implicit memory for negative information, although, they do 
exhibit a strong explicit memory advantage for negative information (Blaney, 1986). 
These findings would imply that the cognitive biases associated with depression operate 
on a strategic, rather than an automatic, level of processing. Such discrepancies in the 
cognitive processing findings for anxiety and depression present a problem for Beck's 
theory, which would predict similar styles of processing bias for both disorders. Thus, the 
discrepant findings have prompted investigators to account for disorder-specific 
processing styles with more refined cognitive processing models. 
Williams' Reformulated Comitive Model 
In response to growing evidence of disorder-specific pattern of cognitive 
processing, Williams and colleagues proposed a revised cognitive formulation of anxiety 
and depression (Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988, 1997). They propose that 
anxiety is primarily characterized by a bias which favors threat stimuli in pre-attentive 
processes (i-e., prior to awareness) and in selective attention. In particular, they 
hypothesize that pre-attentive vigilance for threat reflects a cognitive vulnerability factor 
for clinical anxiety. Thus, individuals who display a permanent tendency to attend to 
threat are more susceptible to the development of anxiety disorders when under stress. In 
contrast, the revised model hypothesiies that depression is associated with biases in post- 
attentive, elaborative processes, thus facilitating recall of negative information. 
In attempting to explain the discrepancies between anxious and depressed 
cognitive processing, Williams and colleagues (1988) invoked Graf and Mandler's (1984) 
model of memory. These authors delineated two processes that can act on mental 
representations: integration and elaboration. Integration is thought to be an automatic 
cognitive process which proceeds without awareness and which serves to strengthen the 
internal structure of a mental representation. A highly integrated representation will be 
accessed more efficiently, since activation of any part will quickly and reliably activate the 
whole. Thus, presentation with one, some, or most of the features consistent with, for 
instance, threat, will activate the whole mental representation of threat. According to 
Williams and colleagues, those with a heightened vulnerability to anxiety will exhibit 
increased integrative processing of mental representations for emotionally negative 
information when they experience an anxious mood state. 
In contrast, elaboration is a strategic process, operating under conscious control 
and serving to strengthen connections between mental representations (Graf & Mandler, 
1984). Highly elaborated mental representations are thought to be retrieved more 
efficiently through explicit, or intentional, memory search due to enriched associative 
connections. According to Williams and colleagues, those with an elevated vulnerability 
to depression will exhibit increased elaborative processing of negative mental 
representations when they experience a depressed mood state. Williams' theory provides 
one explanation why anxious individuals demonstrate an automatic increase in the 
accessibility of negative mental representations when cued with their features in perceptual 
and implicit memory tasks, whereas depressed individuals demonstrate only a strategic 
enhancement of their ability to intentionally retrieve such negative representations during 
explicit memory tasks. 
According to Wdliams' model there are two mechanisms which are responsible for 
the pre-attentive and attentional bias to threat in anxiety. First, an A€Eective Decision 
Mechanism (ADM) is thought to assess the threat value of environmental stimuli. The 
ADM acts to tag certain input units with a threat value, making them subject to 
neuromodulatory control. Second, the output of the ADM feeds into a Resource 
Allocation Mechanism (RAMJ, which determines how processing resources are allocated. 
The finctioning of the RAM is thought to be influenced by trait anxiety. Specifically, high 
trait anxious individuals have permanent tendency to selectively attend to threat, whereas 
low trait anxious individuals tend to avoid threat. As output fiom the ADM increases as a 
result of increased state anxiety or stimulus threat value, processing discrepancies between 
low and high trait anxious individuals becomes more marked. In other words, in the 
absense of stress, when the activation of threat input units is low, attentional differences 
between high and low trait anxious individuals may not be apparent. However, as stress 
increases, high trait anxious individuals become more vigilant, and low trait anxious 
individuals become more avoidant of threat. Williams labels this process the "interaction 
hypothesis," because state and trait anxiety interact to determine pre-attentive and 
attentional biases. The direction of these pre-attentive and attentional biases provide an 
index of vulnerability to generalized anxiety. 
Some researchers have speculated that the specific patterns of bias proposed by 
Williams and colleagues may have developed because of their evolutionary value under the 
circumstances that typically elicit anxiety and depression (MacLeod & McLaughlin, 1995). 
Because depression typically results when actions or plans have resulted in loss or failure, 
it may be adaptive to respond to the emotion by strengthening associative connections 
between current and past cognitive representations of loss and Mure, and attempting to 
extract rules to guide h r e  behavior in a way that will lessen the risk of repetition. In 
contrast, because anxiety is typically elicited when one is faced with the threat of personal 
harm, an adaptive response to this emotion may be a strengthening of the structure of * 
one's mental representations of what constitutes "threat," such that these representations 
will be quickly and easily accessed when one is presented with external threat. 
Problems with Gauging Automaticity with Traditional Measures of Attentional Bias 
Clearly, a crucial tenet of Williams and colleagues' theory is that differing roles are 
assigned to automatic and strategic processing in explaining the patterns of cognitive bias 
found in anxiety and depression. Specifically, the cognitive biases found in anxious 
individuals are thought to operate at a pre-attentive, or automatic level. However, the 
bulk of the research on attentional bias (and all of the research reviewed thus far) has used 
measures which have recently been called into question in terms of their ability to gauge 
automatic processing (MacLeud, 1991). 
Detection paradigms generally require a participant to shift attentional resources to 
threatening information while hdshe is engaged in another task. For example, in the 
dichotic listening task, a participant attends to one of two passages being presented to 
opposite ears while performing a response when specific target words occur in the 
unattended passage. Since the task restricts, but does not prevent, conscious processing 
of information fiom the unattended passage, one cannot rule out the possibility that a bias 
for processiig threatening information is due to strategic, rather than automatic, 
processing. 
As previously mentioned, hcilitation tasks examine whether the anxious are more 
adept at performing tasks that require attentional shifts to threat cues. In the traditional 
dot-probe task, participants perform a response (e.g., a button press) to a neutral visual 
stimulus (e.g., a dot) that replaces either member of a pair of words that appear on a 
computer screen. They read the top word of each pair and press a button whenever they 
detect a dot. On a proportion of trials, one of the two words has a threatening meaning. 
Regrettably, the traditional dot-probe task suffers fiom the same problem as the dichotic 
listening task as a measure of automatic processing. Because words are presented to the 
participant at durations that permit conscious awareness, there is no guarantee that they 
have not been subject to strategic processing. 
Finally, interference tasks require participants to ignore extraneous stimuli while 
performing a task which is unrelated to the detection of threat. Selective attention to 
threat is suggested by performance decrements induced by the presence of threat cues. In 
the aforementioned Stroop task, participants are presented with words on cards or on a 
computer screen and are required to name the color in which each word is printed. The 
task demands that the participant ignore the meaning of the word, despite the fact that 
words vary in emotional valence. Selective attention to threat is reflected by slowed 
reaction times to color-name threat words, because the meaning of the word captures the 
participant's attention, despite hidher effort to attend to the color of the word. 
The emotional Stroop paradigm also has been criticized as being an impure 
measure of automatic processing. Word presentation in the emotional Stroop typically is 
supraliminal, or within the participant's awareness. Supraliminal color naming interference 
effects could reflect biases operating at an automatic, preattentive stage or at later, 
controlled stages of processing (MacLeod, 199 1). Thus, previous Stroop investigations 
utilizing supraliminal presentation do not provide a direct test of WiUiams et al.'s (1988, 
1997) model. 
Pre-attentive Processing Paradigms 
Subliminal Dot-Probe Task. A number of investigators have revised traditional 
selective attention paradigms such that target stimuli are presented subliminally, that is, at 
exposure durations that do not permit conscious awareness. Preattentive biases for face 
stimuli have recently been investigated using a revised version of the dot probe task 
(Mogg & Bradley, 1998). In their task, a pair of faces was presented on a computer 
screen for 14 milliseconds, immediately followed by a pair of masks consisting of 
photographs of faces that had been cut up and randomly reassembled. Then, a dot probe 
was immediately presented in the location of one of the two masks. Participants were 
faster to detect probes occurring in the same location of masked threat faces, particularly 
when the threat face and probe were presented to the left visual field. The results not only 
suggest a preattentive bias for threat, but also indicate a right hemisphere dominance in the 
processing of threat. Mogg and colleagues have since replicated these fkdings, and have 
found that the preattentive bias for threat faces is rhore marked in high, rather than low, 
trait anxious individuals (Mogg et al., 1998). 
Masked st roo^ Color-Naming Task. A masked version of the emotional Stroop 
task, in which each target word is presented on a computer screen very briefly (20 
milliseconds) in white letters superimposed on a background patch of color (e.g., red, 
blue, green or yellow) has been developed and tested (MacLeod & Hagan, 1992). The 
word is immediately replaced by a string of rotated or inverted letter fi-agrnents of 
equivalent length on the same colored background. This mask remains on the screen until 
a voice key detects the participant's color-naming response. The masking procedure is 
intended to block the participant's conscious awareness of the stimulus word, without 
preventing semantic processing. 
In order to ensure that participants are unable to consciously perceive stimulus 
words under the masked condition, the masked Stroop procedure has included "awareness 
checks" after each block of color-naming trials (MacLeod & Hagan, 1992). These checks 
replicate the masked exposure condition exactly, in that a letter string is presented for 20 
msec followed by a pattern mask in the same screen location. The participant's task is to 
identifjr whether the letter string is an English word or not, and to record hisher decision 
by pressing one of two buttons on a response box. Half of the letter strings presented by 
the computer are actual English words, while half are random letter strings. Ifparticipants 
indeed are unable to perceive consciously the stimulus words, their accuracy rate on the 
awareness task should not exceed chance levels (i.e., 50%). 
A Test of Williams' Model: The Masked Stroop Task 
Interaction Hypothesis. MacLeod and Hagan (1 992) were the first researchers to 
test Williams and colleagues' (1988, 1997) interaction hypothesis using both the masked 
and unmasked versions of the Stroop. They were interested in gauging the effects of state 
and trait anxiety on the automatic and strategic patterns of processing selectivity of 
gynecological outpatients awaiting colposcopy investigation. In addition to completing 
questionnaire measures of depression, trait and state anxiety, participants completed the 
two Stroop versions. The masked and unmasked trials were presented randomly, such 
that each stimulus word was shown twice in the masked condition and twice in the 
unmasked condition. The word set consisted of threat-related words (e.g., disease, fital) 
and length-matched non-threat words (e.g., leisure, hobby). Approximately eight weeks 
after completing the Stroop, a proportion of the women, all of whom had received a 
diagnosis of cervical pathology, were asked to complete a mood assessment questionnaire. 
The investigators were interested in whether initial questionnaire scores would be 
associated with color-naming performance on the two Stroop versions. Also, they 
questioned whether any of the initial assessment measures would predict subsequent 
emotional reactions to a later diagnosis of cervical pathology. 
Elevated levels of depression, state, and trait anxiety were not associated with 
increased color-naming latencies for threat words on the unmasked Stroop. However, 
elevated levels of both trait and state anxiety were significantly associated with an inflation 
of color-naming latencies to threat, relative to nonthreat, words in the masked condition. 
These results are consistent with Williams' hypothesis that the anxious pattern of selective 
processing is initiated at an automatic, unconscious level of processing. However, 
somewhat unexpectedly, when stimuli were presented in a manner that allowed their 
conscious identification, high trait anxious participants appeared to be capable of 
strategically negating this automatic processing bias. Interestingly, an index of masked 
threat interference predicted the intensity of depressive and anxiety symptoms when 
participants were later informed of their cervical pathology, whereas questionnaire 
measures failed to do so. 
The researchers suggested that the preattentive bias for threat demonstrated by the 
Stroop task may reflect a vulnerability factor for anxiety (MacLeod & Hagan, 1992). 
Thus, specific patterns of processing selectivity, in this case, selective processing of threat 
information, may moderate emotional response to stressfd life events. A subsequent 
cross-sectional study found a similar relationship between preconscious bias and self- 
reported vulnerability to life stress in healthy volunteers (van den Hout, Temey, Huygens, 
& De Jong, 1995). Thus, individuals who demonstrate an increased tendency to be 
vigilant for threat may be more susceptible to developing emotional disorders when 
confronted with stress. 
In an effort to fbrther investigate the interactive effects of state and trait anxiety on 
selective attention, one study examined masked and unmasked Stroop performance of high 
and low trait anxious undergraduate students who were exposed to stress or relaxation 
inductions (Mogg, Kemtish, & Bradley, 1993). The Stroop task consisted of four 
categories of words matched for word length and frequency: threat-related (e.g., paralysis, 
ridicule), positive (e.g., beauty, bliss), categorized neutral (household terms, e.g. 
bookcase, fiunishd), and uncategorized neutral (e.g., emblem, downwind). Presentation 
mode (i.e., blocked versus random) was varied in order to gauge its effect on color- 
naming intederence. 
Consistent with the interaction hypothesis (Wiiiams et al., 1988, 1997), high trait 
anxiety was found to correlate with enhanced intederence with the color-naming of threat 
stimuli. The authors hypothesiied that their method of dividing groups with a median split 
on trait scores did not lend itself well to an ANOVA, which would treat trait anxiety as a 
dichotomous variable. Interestingly, lower state anxiety was associated with greater 
interference with the color-naming of positive stimuli in the subliminal condition. This 
finding appeared to be consistent with a mood-congruent processing bias, such that 
induction of a pleasant mood (via relaxation training) was associated with selective 
processiig of positive stimuli. The hct that this result was only evident in the subliminal 
condition suggests that the selective processing of mood-congruent information occurs at 
an automatic, or preattentive, level. 
The study's third finding was somewhat unexpected in the context of Williams' 
model. Low state anxiety was found to be associated with enhanced intederence effects 
for color-naming threat stimuli, but only in the supraliminal condition. This finding 
suggests a mood-incongruent processing bias for threat information that is available to 
conscious awareness. The authors hypothesized that normal participants in whom an 
anxious state has been induced may employ a cognitive strategy that inhiiits further 
processing of threatening information. A cognitive processing strategy of this sort would 
serve the adaptive function of counteracting temporary, negative mood states. 
In summary, the studies by Mogg et al. (1993) and MacLmd and Hagan (1992), 
would seem to indicate that, when stimuli are presented under conditions of little or no 
awareness, Stroop interference effects appear to be consistently mood-congruent. 
Consistent with Williams' model, high trait anxious individuals exhibit an automatic, pre- 
attentive processing bias for threat information. However, unexplained by the model is the 
finding that high trait anxious individuals are able to strategically suppress this automatic 
bias when they are consciously aware of negative stimuli in their environment. That is, 
they appear to adopt controlled, mood-incongruent processing strategies which serve to 
regulate mood. Ifthis is, indeed, the case then the subliminal Stroop task may provide a 
more reliable measure of anxiety-related processing biases, in that it is not confounded by 
the participant's response strategies. 
Pre-attentive Processiia Biases in Clinical Populations. In light of the 
aforementioned findings, Williams and colleagues (1997) updated their cognitive model, 
arguing that the critical difference between high trait anxious and clinically anxious 
individuals may be their differential use of cognitive strategies to override the effects of 
pre-attentive processing biases for threatening information. Specifically, clinically 
signrficant anxiety is characterized by an absence of conscious strategies to over-ride the 
pre-attentive bias for threat cues. If this is the case, then clinically-anxious individuals 
should show equivalent patterns of elevated Stroop color-naming interference on both 
subliminally- and supraliminally-presented threat words. Mogg, Bradley, Wrlliarns, and 
Mathews (1993) were the first researchers to administer both versions of the Stroop task 
to a clinical sample. They hoped to confirm Wrlliarns et al.'s assertion that anxiety, but 
not depression, is associated with a pre-attentive bias for threatening information. 
Participants in Mogg et al.3 (1993) investigation were individuals with a DSM-III- 
R (APA, 1987) diagnosis of generalized anxiety disorder or major depression, and normal 
controls. Stroop stimuli consisted of five categories of words: anxiety-relevant (e.g., 
embarrassed, cancer), depression-relevant (e.g., misery, discouraged), categorized neutral 
(e.g., household items such as carpet and domestic), positive words (e.g., adorable, bliss), 
and uncategorized neutral (e.g., geometry, exchange). All word types were matched for 
length and frequency of use in the language. Participants also completed questionnaire 
measures of Gerbal ability, depression, and state and trait anxiety. 
The results of the study supported Williams' hypothesis that there is a preattentive 
processing bias in anxiety, but not in depression. However, the processing bias was not 
s p d c  to anxiety-related words. Instead, anxious individuals were slower to name 
negative words, in general, that were subliminally presented. This result is somewhat at 
odds with previous studies demonstrating interference effects that are specific to the 
primary concerns of anxious individuals. However, the authors noted that earlier findings 
were obtained with stimuli that were presented supraliminally and in a blocked format. 
Both of these presentation features may have provided increased opportunity for 
elaborative processing of the semantic content of the word stimuli. In the present study, 
the absence of such an opportunity for elaborative processing resulted in selective 
processing effects of a relatively non-specific fashion. Thus, interference effects may 
occur when stimuli have undergone a relatively superficial level of semantic analysis 
regarding their global negative characteristics (Mogg et al., 1993). 
Mogg and colleagues found that the pre-attentive bias for negative stimuli found in 
the clinically anxious extended to stimuli that were presented to conscious awareness. 
However, the effect of interference for supraliminal threat words was confounded with the 
effects of word category. In particular, anxious individuals were slower in color naming 
uncategorized than categorized neutral words, but only for supraliminally-presented 
material. The authors suggested that supraliminal color-naming, which is subject to 
controlled, strategic processes, may be influenced by categorical priming effects. This 
underscores the necessity of including matched sets of neutral, categorized words when 
administering the supraliminal Stroop. In contrast, there was no evidence that interference 
effects in the subliminal condition were confounded by word categorization. 
A more recent study suggests that, in panic patients, pre-attentive bias may be 
specific to physical threat information. Lundh and colleagues compared DSM-lV (APA, 
1994) diagnosed panic disorder patients to age- and sex-matched controls on a Stroop 
task consisting of panic-related threat, interpersonal threat and neutral words presented 
both subliminally and supraliially (Lundh, Wikstrom, Westerlund, & Ost, 1999). Their 
methodology diered somewhat &om past Stroop studies in that each participant's 
threshold for conscious word identification was determined by a pre-test. The rationale for 
this procedure was to decrease the possibility that participants with higher thresholds 
would be presented with words at durations that not only barred conscious word 
identification, but also semantic activation of meaning structures. 
Individuals with panic disorder exhibited significant Stroop interference for panic- 
related words both at the subliminal and supraliminal level. A similar but less robust effect 
was seen for interpersonal threat words, but this effect did not remain significant when 
tested separately at the subliminal and supraliminal levels. It should be noted, however, 
that supraliminal Stroop findings in this study may be confounded with the effects of word 
categorization, because the set of control words was not semantically-related. 
Interestingly, indices of subliminal and supraliminal Stroop interference for panic-related 
words did not correlate with each other, suggesting that the two tasks measure separate 
kinds of processes. None of the measures of Stroop interference correlated with anxiety 
sensitivity, suggesting that interference for threat words is not related to the "fear of fear" 
that is characteristic of panic disorder. Consistent with previous studies, subliminal, but 
not supraliinal, interference for panic-related words correlated with measures of trait 
anxiety and depression. Accordingly, the authors suggested that subliminal Stroop 
interference seems to be a marker for a more general disposition to negative affect. 
Although previous research indicates that non-clinical samples with high trait 
anxiety are able to counteract their automatic, preattentive bias for threat-related 
information by means of consciously controlled, strategic processes (MacLeod & Hagan, 
1992; Mogg et al., 1993), the study by Lundh and colleagues (1999) suggests that panic 
disorder patients lack the ability to neutralize their automatic, pre-attentive biases through 
conscious strategies. Researchers have previously suggested that this discrepancy 
accounts for the exaggerated severity of anxiety symptoms in clinical populations 
(MacLeod & Hagan, 1992). However, according to Lundh and colleagues, this line of 
reasoning does not explain why the subliminal and supraliminal interference indices did not 
correlate. They suggest that panic patients differ in the degree to which they are able to 
counteract preattentive biases for threat-related information by means of conscious 
strategies, and that this ability is unrelated to general negative affect. 
Of particular relevance to the current proposal, van den Hout and colleagues 
demonstrated a pre-attentive bias for threat in a phobic sample (van den Hout, Tenney, 
Huygens, & De Jong, 1997). They administered both the masked and unmasked Stroop 
tasks to a sample with highly circumscribed fears: specific (spider) phobics. The Stroop 
stimulus words consisted of spider words (e.g., spider, web, hairy, legs, insect) and neutral 
words (e.g., square, potato, fork, blanket, pen) which were matched for word length and 
frequency of use. Because previous studies have demonstrated that general trait anxiety is 
related to subliminal Stroop interference, the authors hypothesized that the severity of 
spider phobia would most strongly correlate with such interference. 
As predicted, selective interference for spider words presented both subliminally 
and supraliminally was significantly associated with a questionnaire measure of severity of 
spider phobia. Furthermore, the association between pre-conscious processing bias and 
phobia severity was not moderated by anxiety sensitivity, neuroticism or other 
psychological problems. Previous studies have found a positive correlation between threat 
interference on the masked Stroop and both generalized anxiety and trait anxiety, 
phenomena which are thought to be associated with generalized negative dFectivity, or 
neuroticism. However, the present results indicate that the preconscious processing bias 
may not be an artifact of general negative affectivity, but may be tied to anxiety its& 
Discrepant Findings 
Effects of Treatment on Pre-attentive Biases. If pre-attentive vigilance for threat 
represents a permanent, automatic cognitive vulnerability factor, as is suggested by 
Wdliarns et al. (1988, 1997), one would expect that it would be resistant to change by 
strategic means, such as cognitive-behavior therapy. However, two studies suggest that 
this is not the case. 
The aforementioned study of individuals with spider phobia found that masked and 
unmasked Stroop interference for spider-related, versus neutral, words significantly 
decreased after a one-session treatment of in-vivo exposure (van den Hout et al., 1997). 
Although the conclusions drawn from this study are limited by the fact that no comparison 
group was included in the design, the results are suggestive of the idea that conscious and 
preconscious processiig biases may be altered by treatment. The authors hypothesize that 
exposure therapy "eliminates the erroneous perception of a probabilistic association 
between a phobic CS (regardless of whether it is a spider, a palpitation, or an obsessional 
intrusion) and an aversive US (whether it be a spider bite, a heart attack, or catching an 
infectious disease)" (Davey, 1992 as cited in van den Hout et al., 1997). 
A second study indicates that combined cognitive and behavioral strategies are 
capable of altering processing biases for threat words presented both supraliminally and 
subliminally (Mogg, Bradley, Millar, & White, 1995). Clients with generalized anxiety 
disorder (without depression) and non-anxious controls completed both versions of the 
Stroop task and questionnaire measures of verbal ability, depression, and anxiety. In 
addition, they were asked to rate the frequency of their negative thoughts and worries 
related to physical concerns, social concerns, and depression. The Stroop stimuli 
consisted of anxiety-relevant, depression-relevant, categorized neutral, and uncategorized 
neutral words. The GAD group then participated in a 6-session cognitive-behavioral 
treatment, consisting of anxiety management training (i.e., relaxation) and cognitive 
coping procedures. Both groups completed the Stroop task and questionnaires two 
months after the initial testing. In addition, the GAD group completed the task again 20 
months after the initial testing. 
Prior to treatment, clients with GAD showed significantly greater interference 
than controls in color-naming negative words in both supra- and sub-threshold exposure 
conditions. However, after treatment, there was no significant difference in bias between 
the groups, suggesting that the processing bias was altered by psychological treatment. 
Although trait anxiety did not change significantly fiom pre- to post-treatment, significant 
reductions were observed in all measures of anxiety and depression from pre-treatment to 
20-month follow-up. Furthermore, the reduction in preconscious bias correlated with 
reduction in anxious thoughts, and this relationship was maintained throughout the 20- 
month follow-up period. Reductions in state anxiety did not correlate with reductions in 
Stroop interference, but reductions in trait anxiety correlated with unmasked Stroop 
interference for both anxiety and depression-related words. 
These results suggest that the preconscious bias for negative information in GAD 
clients is not an immutable feature of anxiety-prone individuals, because it was amenable 
to reduction by cognitive behavioral strategies. This finding seems inconsistent with 
Williams' assertion that the pre-attentive bias is a permanent vulnerability factor and raises 
renewed question as to what such a bias represents. The study did not find significant 
correlations between change in preconscious bias and change in questionnaire measures of 
state anxiety. Significant correlations were found, however, between reductions in 
preconscious bias and reductions in reports of anxious thoughts and worries. This finding 
suggests that these two factors may reflect a common underlying mechanism which is 
susceptible to psychological treatment. Although the nature of this mechanism has yet to 
be determined, it would appear that it operates automatically, "outside conscious 
awareness, that it is responsive to the presence of threat stimuli, and that it is responsible 
for interrupting and diverting processing resources away fiom on-going activities in favour 
of negative information." Thus, the findings of Mogg and colleagues' longitudinal study 
suggest the subliminal Stroop task may be particularly sensitive to the cognitive 
mechanism that underlies the production of anxious thoughts and worries in clinical 
anxiety states. 
Discrepant Findin~s 11: Stroo? Suppression in Clinical S a m p h  Williams and 
colleagues (1997) argue that the critical difference between high trait anxious and 
clinically anxious individuals is their differential use of cognitive strategies to override the 
effects of pre-attentive processing biases for threatening information. Consistent with this 
hypothesis, MacLeod and Rutherford (1992) found that, under conditions of high state 
anxiety, both high and low trait anxious individuals showed significant decreases in color- 
naming latencies for supralirninal threat words. That is, regardless of trait anxiety level, 
normal individuals who were exposed to an anxiety-inducing stressor were able to 
strategically avoid processing threat stimuli associated with the source of this anxiety. 
If it is the case that clinically si@cant anxiety is characterized by an absence of 
conscious strategies to over-ride the pre-attentive bias for threat cues, then such 
individuals should show equivalent patterns of elevated Stroop color-naming interference 
on both subliminally- and supraliminally-presented threat words. However, at least a 
couple of ipvestigations suggest that, when confkonted with stress, individuals with 
phobias are able to strategically suppress their attentional bias for threatening information. 
First, using the unmasked Stroop task, Mathews and Sebastian (1 993) found that highly 
snake-phobic undergraduate students who were induced to be state anxious through 
exposure to a live snake exhibited suppression of their previous attentional bias for snake- 
related words. 
This finding has since been replicated in a DSM-1.1-R diagnosed sample of 
individuals with social phobia (Amir, McNally, Riemann, & Burns, 1996). Both 
individuals with social phobia and community controls completed an unmasked Stroop 
task consisting of social threat words, physical threat words, and two sets of neutral 
control words. The Stroop task was the earlier card version, such that word categories 
were presented in a blocked, massed format. After completing the Stroop task and a set 
of questionnaire measures, participants were told that they would shortly be giving a brief, 
3-minute speech on a topic of their choosing. They were told that their speech would be 
audiotaped for later scoring. However, prior to giving the speech, they were asked to 
complete the second Stroop task and set of questionnaires. After the second set of 
measures, the participants were told that they would not be giving a speech and were 
debriefed. 
The anxiety manipulation proved effective in significantly increasing state anxiety, 
although only in the social phobia group. Both groups showed an overall speeding of 
response latencies when confronted with anxiety. When individuals with social phobia 
were tested under conditions of low anxiety, they exhibited significantly greater 
interference effects for social threat than physical threat words. However, under 
conditions of high anxiety this pattern was reversed: interference for physical threat words 
in individuals with social phobia was significantly greater than that for social threat words. 
Thus, inconsistent with W111ia.m~ and colleagues' model, under stressfbl conditions, even 
clinical populations possess the capacity to suppress their attentional bias for threatening 
information. 
The Vigilance-Avoidance Model 
Mogg and colleagues (1997) have recently outlined a two-stage, vigilance- 
avoidance model of information processing which both explains the maintenance of 
anxiety and would seem to account for recent discrepant findings of Stroop effect 
suppression. They posit that individuals with social phobia, for example, may possess the 
capacity to swiftly identi@ socially threatening information, but subsequently may fail to 
extensively process such information due to cognitive avoidance. Avoidance of strategic 
processing of this information would prevent habituation, or objective evaluation, of such 
material. As a result, the threatening information would retain its anxiety-provoking 
effects. 
' 
With respect to Stroop performance, the vigilancelavoidance model would predict 
an initial, pre-attentive bias for threatening information, followed by suppression of this 
bias in the attentive stage. This theory is consistent with the pattern of attention found in 
phobics under stress. Furthermore, this sequence of events also could account for the 
puzzling lack of findings of a memory bias for such threatening information in the anxious. 
To date, the masked and unmasked versions of the Stroop have yet to be employed in 
order to examine patterns of pre-attentive and attentional biases of phobic samples under 
stress. However, one study by Arnir and colleagues (1998) suggests that the attentional 
process is not a unitary one. Generalized social phobics were asked to respond to cue 
words following sentences ending either in threat homographs (e.g., "She wrote down the 
mean.. . . . . .UNFRIENDLY") or nonhomographs (e.g., W e  dug with a spade.. . . . . .ACE"). 
At short presentation intervals (1 00 ms), individuals with social phobia took longer to 
respond to cue words following sentences ending in threat homographs than cue words 
following sentences ending in non-homographs, suggesting that the inappropriate meaning 
of the threat homograph was initially activated. At longer intervals (850 ms), however, 
activation of the inappropriate meaning was suppressed. Although these results appear to 
support a vigilanudavoidance attentional pattern, both presentation intervals allowed for 
conscious awareness of stimuli and thus no conclusions can be drawn regarding pre- 
attentive processing. 
A pattern of activation and inhibition of threat information would explain the 
discrepant Stroop findings with respect to attentional bias in phobic individuals. When 
anxious, phobic clients may be particularly adept at avoiding the threat meaning of socially 
relevant material. In the case of individuals with social phobia, this process plays a role in 
the maintenance of social fears. Avoidance of threatening social cues may result in an 
inability to encode relevant aspects of social performance. In the absence of elaborate 
representations of social interaction, individuals with social phobia may evaluate their 
performance based on their emotional reaction during the interaction, rather than what 
actually transpired. Indeed, this sequence of events is consistent with the finding that 
individuals with social phobia are more likely to negatively evaluate their social 
performance on behavioral tasks than are independent judges (Rapee & Lim, 1992). 
Summary of Prowsal and Hypotheses 
Current cognitive processing models of psychopathology theorize that those who 
suffer with anxiety disorders will exhibit the tendency to preferentially process threatening 
information in their environment (Williams et al., 1997). In individuals with social phobia, 
this processing bias has been shown for attention (Arnir et al, 19%) and interpretation 
(Foa, F d i n ,  Perry, & Herbert, 1996), but not for memory (Rapee et al., 1994). Despite 
the fact that preferential processing of threatening information has been proposed as an 
explanation for the etiology and maintenance of emotional disorders, little is known about 
the mechanism underlying this preference (Wiiarns et al., 1997). 
Wiiarns and colleagues (1997) have suggested that, when anxious, normal 
participants may increase their effort in order to compensate for color-naming 
interference. Thus, they possess the ability to "override" their attentional bias under times 
of stress. However, inconsistent with Williams' explanation, Amir and colleagues (1 996) 
found that this "override" effect is not limited to non-patients. Both groups of controls 
and individuals with social phobia showed a general speeding of response latencies under 
stress. Contrary to prediction, individuals with social phobia were better able to suppress 
interference for socially threatening words, suggesting that they are more adept at 
avoidance when they are anxious. 
Mogg and colleagues' (Mogg, Bradley, Bono, & Painter, 1997) two-stage, 
vigilancdavoidance model of information processing would appear to be effective both in 
explaining the maintenance of clinical anxiety and in clzuit'ying recent discrepant findings of 
Stroop-effect suppression. The authors posit that individuals with phobias may possess 
the capacity to swiftly identify socially threatening information, but subsequently may fail 
to process extensively such information due to cognitive avoidance. Avoidance of 
strategic processing of threatening information would prevent habituation, or objective 
evaluation, of such material. As a result, the threatening information retains its anxiety- 
provoking effects. 
The featured study is a test of the vigilancdavoidance model in a socially anxious 
analogue sample. A variant of MacLeod and Hagan's (1 992) subliminal Stroop paradigm 
was employed in order to examine patterns of pre-attentive and attentional processing of 
threat cues in undergraduate students with and without significant social anxiety. 
Participants were exposed to words related to social threat (e.g., embarrass), physical 
threat (e.g., stroke), categorized neutral words denoting household items (e.g., carpet), 
and uncategorized neutral words (e.g., reported). Each word was presented in a 
subliminal and supraliminal format. In addition, examination of Stroop performance prior 
to and after the initiation of an anxiety induction procedure served to elucidate the effects 
of stress on pre-selective and selective attention for threatening information. There were 
five chief predictions. 
The first aim of the current experiment was to test the hypothesis that there is a 
pre-attentive bias in social anxiety. Specifically, socially anxious individuals, but not 
control participants, were expected to demonstrate a processing bias for threatening 
information that is automatic in the sense that it operates outside of conscious awareness. 
Relative to non-anxious controls, individuals with high levels of social anxiety would 
exhibit greater interference for subliminal threat words than for neutral words. Although 
pre-attentive processes have been examined in other clinical populations (i.e., PTSD, panic 
disorder, specific phobia, GAD), to date, the subliminal Stroop has not been administered 
to a clinical or sub-clinical socially anxious sample. 
The second hypothesis concerns the content-specificity of the processing bias. 
This experiment examined whether the processing bias is specific to socially threatening 
information or to other types of threatening information (e.g., physical threat). Although 
this question has not been examined in a socially anxious population, previous research 
indicates that clients with GAD exhibit a pre-attentive bias for both subliminally-presented 
anxiety and depression-related words, suggesting that interference effects may occur after 
stimuli have undergone a relatively superficial level of semantic analysis regarding their 
global negative characteristics (Mogg et al., 1993). Consistent with these findings, 
individuals with panic disorder have been found to exhibit subliminal interference for 
physical threat and, to a lesser degree, social threat words (Lundh et al., 1999). Van den 
Hout and colleagues (1997) found significant subliminal Stroop interference for spider- 
specific versus neutral words in spider phobics, however, their design did not include a 
control set of threatening, non-spider-related words. 
The third hypothesis concerns the attentional pattern of the socially anxious under 
non-stressful conditions. In the absence of stress, it has already been predicted that the 
experimental group will demonstrate greater interference, or vigilance, for threat word 
presented at intervals too short for elaborate processing. However, what happens later in 
the attentional process, when threatening information is presented for time intervals 
allowing for more elaborate processing? Given the opportunity for more elaborate 
processing of meaning, those with high social anxiety were expected to exhibit greater 
interference for supraliminal social threat words than for physical threat or neutral words. 
That is, the attentional bias should become more content specific with longer exposure 
durations and increased time for processing. This hypothesis is consistent with previous 
research in which individuals with social phobia displayed an attentional bias that was 
largely specific for supraliminally-presented social threat words (Hope et al., 1990; Mattia 
et al., 1993; Lundh & Ost, 1996). However, these studies have been criticized on 
methodological grounds for their choice of a blocked versus random format of word 
category presentation. A blocked form of presentation may promote semantic priming, 
which could produce Stroop interference effects. Only one study of individuals with social 
phobia has demonstrated selective interference for supraliinal social threat words 
presented in a random format (Maidenberg et al., 1996). Two other studies failed to find 
Stroop interference for social threat even when words were presented in a blocked format 
(Holle et al., 1997; Niekerk et al., 1999). The present study utilized a random mode of 
word presentation in an attempt to replicate Maidenberg and colleagues' (1996) findings 
in a socially anxious analogue sample. 
The fourth hypothesis concerns the effects of exposure to a stress induction (i.e., 
the threat of giving a speech) on attentional patterns in the socially anxious. It was 
predicted that increased state anxiety would increase pre-attentive vigilance for threat, but 
only in the high socially anxious sample. This prediction is consistent with the Williams et 
al. (1988, 1997) interaction hypothesis of information processing. Because the vigilant 
processing mode is hypothesized to operate at a preconscious level a stress-induced 
increase in subliminal color naming interference was expected to be evident in the socially 
anxious sample, but only for subliminally-presented threat stimuli. No significant increase 
in pre-attentive processing was predicted in the low socially anxious group as they are 
presented with the stress induction. 
When under stress, it was hypothesized that the socially anxious sample would 
demonstrate greater suppression of interference (i.e., facilitation) for socially threatening 
information that is presented at durations permitting elaborate processing of meaning 
(supraliminal presentation). Thus, consistent with Mogg and colleagues' (1997) two- 
stage, vigilance-avoidance model of information processing, after subjection to a stress 
induction, the socially anxious sample would demonstrate an initial automatic orientation 
(or vigilance) for threat, followed by avoidance of social threat in later attentional 
processes. Avoidance of social threat would be evident in facilitation of processing of 
socially threatening information. As cognitive avoidance is seen as a strategic process, this 
pattern of Stroop effect suppression would be evident only for social threat words 
presented within conscious awareness (supraliminal presentation). 
The fitth hypothesis concerns the relationship between Stroop performance and 
self-reported social fear, avoidance, and depression. It was predicted that both phobic fear 
and avoidance would be significantly and positively associated with a pre-attentive 
vigilance for threat words. Increases in state anxiety brought on by the anxiety induction 
would M e r  strengthen these correlations. However, self-reported social fear and 
avoidance would be negatively associated with interference for social threat words after 
initiation of the stress induction. Depression severity was not expected to correlate with 
any measure of attentional bias, as it was hypothesized that depression is characterized by 
biases in later stages of processing. High state anxiety was expected to positively 
correlate with interference for subliminal and facilitation for supraliminal threat words in 
the socially anxious. 
Significance of the Proposal 
The current investigation sought to elucidate the patterns of pre-attentive and 
attentional bias for threatening information in a socially anxious sample. Moreover, it 
investigated whether these patterns change as a function of the degree of situational stress 
that an individual experiences. A pre-attentive or attentional bias for threat, in general, 
may not necessarily be a sign of anxiety proneness. Indeed, such a bias has been found in 
low trait anxious individuals when external stimuli have high threat value. Certainly, 
orientation towards real environmental threat has substantial adaptive value in terms of 
protection fiom harm. However, the presence of pre-attentive and attentional biases for 
mild threat stimuli such as words not only would be unhelpll in maintaining attention on 
current goals, but would be counterproductive in maintaining a positive mood state. 
Although only research of a longitudinal nature can address whether such biases are a 
determinant of anxiety vulnerability, current research strongly suggests that they represent 
a sign of anxiety vulnerabirlity. 
Of central importance to the current investigation, however, is the role of 
preattentive and attentional biases in the maintenance of anxiety states. As a result of such 
biases, minor threat cues in the environment may be more likely to enter the focus of 
anxiety-prone individuals. This, in turn, would both reinforce anxious individuals' 
perception of the world as being an aversive or unsafe place and enhance their anxious 
mood. Moreover, if anxiety-prone individuals automatically orient their attention to minor 
threats in the environment, but do not maintain their attentional focus on such stimuli 
s&ciently to allow objective evaluation of them, this might increase sensitivity to such 
stimuli and interfere with habituation. Thus, anxiety would be maintained over the long 
term. 
METHOD 
Participants 
Participants were recruited fiom undergraduate psychology classes at the 
University of MainelOrono campus. Classes were screened using the Liebowitz Social 
Anxiety Scale (LSAS; Liebowitz, 1987), which was re-named the "Reactions to Social 
Situations Questionnaire7' in order to minimize response bias. In total, 377 
undergraduates consented to participate in the questionnaire screening process (Consent 
Form I, Appendix A). Respondents who obtained a LSAS Total score corresponding to 
at least 1.5 standard deviations above the sample mean were eligible to participate as a 
member of the socially anxious group. Control group participants scored at least 1.3 
standard deviations below the sample mean. All participants were required to be 18 to 65 
years old, free of current psychotropic medications, fiee of current panic attacks, and not 
suffering fiom color-blindness. All participants were offered two hours worth of extra 
credit for use in their undergraduate psychology class. If they had already obtained their 
extra credit, they were offered $15 for their participation. 
Sixty-six individuals completed the full set of procedures, although data fiom four 
individuals were excluded due to loss of more than 10?4 of their Stroop data. The final 
sample s i i  still allowed for sufficient statistical power to detect significant differences 
between subgroups (n=3 1 low socially anxious, n=3 1 high socially anxious). The control 
group was matched to the experimental group on the variables of age and gender. 
Assessment 
Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS; Liebowitz, 1987). The LSAS is a 24-item 
self-report measure of social anxiety and avoidance of situations that involve either 
observation by or interaction with others. The scale consists of 13 items pertaining to 
performance situations (Performance Subscale), and 1 1 items pertaining to social 
interaction situations (Social Interaction Subscale). Sample Social Interaction Subscale 
items include "meeting strangers" and "talking to people in authority", whereas sample 
Performance Subscale items include "speaking up at a meeting" or "acting, performing, or 
giving a talk in fiont of an audience". Each item is rated separately for Fear (W'none," 
l="mild," 2="moderate," 3="severe") and for Avoidance Behavior (Wnever [O?!]," 
l="occasionally [lO?!]," 2="often [33-67%]," 3="usually [67-10O?!l"). The LSAS yields 
an Overall Severity rating, as well as scores on four subscales: Performance Fear, 
Performance Avoidance, Social Fear, and Social Avoidance. 
An initial demonstration of the two-week test-retest reliability in a sample of 60 
DSM-111-R diagnosed social phobics showed high reliability coefficients for the 
Performance (r.91) and Social (r .89) Subscales (Liebowitz, 1987). With respect to the 
concurrent validity of the LSAS, Heimberg, Mueller, Holt, Hope, and Liebowitz (1992) 
found that the LSAS Performance Fear Subscale was moderately correlated (r.69) with 
the Social Phobia Scale, which is a self-report measure of the fear of being scrutinized. 
Futherrnore, the LSAS Social Interaction Subscale was moderately correlated (r.60) with 
the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale, which assesses positive and negative self-statements 
concerning heterosocial interaction. 
Brown, Heimberg, and Juster (1995) demonstrated the discriminant validity of the 
LSAS. For the purposes of a treatment study, 108 participants were divided, based on 
DSM-III-R criteria, into three groups: 1) those with generalized social phobia and 
avoidant personality disorder @=28), 2) those with generalized SP without APD (n=36), 
and 3) those with non-generalized social phobia without APD (n=38). Baseline 
assessment including the LSAS showed significant differences in severity among the three 
groups, with generalized SP with APD demonstrating the most fear and avoidance, 
followed by generalized SP without APD, and non-generalized SP. Holt and colleagues 
found a similar pattern of differences in LSAS Fear and Avoidance Subscale scores among 
a sample of 33 individuals with social phobia divided into the same categories (Holt, 
Heimberg, & Hope, 1992). 
As an outcome measure, the LSAS has been used successfidly in several 
phamcologic trials for social phobia as well as in studies of psychosocial treatment. In 
each of these studies, the LSAS reliably assessed clinically signrticant changes following 
treatment with pharmacologic agents (Liebowitz et al., 1992) and CBT (Brown, 
Heimberg, & Juster, 1995). 
The LSAS's relevance to the present study lies in its abiity to discriminate reliably 
normal from socially anxious populations. Published normative data (Liebowitz, 1987) on 
the LSAS were used to determine cut-off scores corresponding to low and high levels of 
social anxiety. 
Social Phobia and Anxiety Inventory (SPAI; Turner et al., 1989). The SPAI is an 
empirically-derived, 45-item self-report measure of social phobia across a range of 
potentially distressing situations. The SPAI includes two subscales: Social Phobia (SP) 
and Agoraphobia (AG). The former subscale consists of 32 items and assesses the 
cognitive, behavioral, and somatic manifestations of social phobia across a number of 
social-evaluative situations. In addition, 21 of the 32 SP items assess degree of distress in 
various social situations based on the presence of four different audience groups: 
strangers, authority figures, the opposite sex, and people in general. Other SP items ask 
respondents to rate the degree to which they experience various somatic symptoms prior 
to or during social situations. The Agoraphobia subscale, consisting of 13 items, assesses 
fear in situations typically avoided by individuals with agoraphobia (e.g., crowds, public 
transportation, waiting in lines) and was added to help differentiate social phobia from the 
social anxiety that frequently accompanies agoraphobia. A 7-point Likert-scale format is 
used to assess the fiequency with which each item is experienced, with 0 indicating 
"never" and 7 indicating "always7'. 
The Agoraphobia and Social Phobia subscales are scored separately. A Total 
score for the SPAI is derived by calculating the difference between the Social Phobia and 
Agoraphobia subscale scores. Turner et al. (1989) suggest that this Difference score is the 
best measure of social phobia since it controls for the anxiety associated with agoraphobia 
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situations. However, Herbert, Bellack, and Hope (1991) found that both the Social 
Phobia score and the Difference score had siilar correlations with other measures of 
social anxiety, whereas the Agoraphobia score was not related to any of them. 
Turner et al. (1 989) provided initial data on the reliability and discriminant validity 
of the SPAI in a sample of 306 participants recruited from undergraduate psychology 
classes, 56 of whom were determined to be socially anxious based on a screening battery 
of previously proven valid and reliable measures as well as the Anxiety Disorders 
Interview Schedule (ADIS; DSTardo, 07Brien, Barlow, Waddell, & Blanchard, 1983). 
Test-retest reliability for the Difference score over a span of two weeks was -86 (separate 
reliabilities were not reported for each subscale). Internal consistency, as gauged by 
Cronbach's alpha, was calculated for the Social Phobia and Agoraphobia subscales, 
producing coefficients of .96 and .85 respectively. Participants identified as socially 
phobic based on the screening battery and structured clinical interview scored significantly 
higher on the SPAT than their non-socially anxious counterparts, thus demonstrating the 
discriminative validity of the SPAT in a college student sample. 
With respect to the SPAT'S construct validity, a confirmatory factor analysis has 
validated the existence of the two subscales in both a population of 72 individuals with a 
DSM-111 diagnosis of social phobia and 308 introductory psychology students (Turner et 
al., 1989). The results suggested that the subscales were unique and usefhl in 
differentiating various anxious and n o d  groups. The SPAT'S concurrent validity with 
respect to other measures of social anxiety and avoidance also has been demonstrated in a 
sample of 25 patients meeting DSM-111-R criteria for social phobia (Herbert, Bellack, & 
Hope, 1991). 
The SPAT has been shown to distinguish clients with social phobia from normals 
and from those with other anxiety disorders. Beidel and colleagues (1989) found that the 
SPAT correctly classified 74.1% of individuals with social phobia and 75% of controls (a 
statistically signrficant finding) in a sample of 308 undergraduate students. In a clinical 
population (N=84), the subscales were useM in differentiating the responses of individuals 
with social phobia, agoraphobia, and obsessive-compulsive disorder (Turner et al., 1989). 
Individuals with social phobia had significantly higher SPAT Difference scores than did 
clients with panic disorder with or without agoraphobia or obsessive-compulsive disorder. 
Based on their initial findings, Turner et al. (1 989) suggested that a cut-off SPAT 
Difference score of 60 should warrant evaluation for social phobia. A cut-off score of 80 
maximizes the identification rate, although it may lead to some false negatives. Finally, the 
SPAI is a sensitive measure of clinically significant change following treatment with 
phannacologic or behavior therapy (Beidel, Turner, & Cooley, 1993). 
The SPAI's relevance to the current study lies both in its ability to thoroughly 
assess the severity of cognitive, overt behavioral, and physiological symptoms of social 
anxiety. 
Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (FNE; Watson & Friend, 1969). The FNE is a 
measure of cognitions hypothesized to be representative of social phobia. The original 
measure is a 30-item, true-false questionnaire. However, Leary (1983) has developed a 
shortened, 12-item version of the form. Items on the short form gauge the degree to 
which the respondent endorses various self-statements related to social situations (e.g., 
'When I am talking with someone, I worry about what they may be thinking of me"). 
Items are rated on a five-point Likert scale ( lznot  at all characteristic of me" to 
5="extremely characteristic of me") with possible total FNE scores ranging fiom 12 to 60. 
Four items are reverse scored. 
The short form correlates highly with the original scale (r.96) and has been found 
to possess inter-item and test-retest reliabilities of .92 and -75, respectively (leary, 1983). 
With respect to concurrent validity, Smith and Sarason (1975) found that individuals who 
obtained high scores on the FNE experienced significantly more distress in response to 
receiving negative feedback and rated themselves as more likely to receive negative 
evaluations fiom others than did those who scored low on the FNE. Likewise, high 
scorers are significantly more inclined to avoid threatening social comparison information 
(Friend & Gilbert, 1973). Finally, scores on the FNE are sensitive to clinical 
improvements resulting fiom psychosocial treatment (Mattick & Peters, 1988; Mattick, 
Peters, & Clark, 1989). 
In the present study, the FNE was administered as a primary measure of the 
severity of participants' social evaluative cognitions. The FNE was expected to correlate 
with Stroop color-naming interference for social threat words. 
Social Avoidance and Distress Scale--Avoidance Subscale (SAD; Watson & 
Friend, 1969). The SAD is a 28-item, true-false questionnaire assessing anxiety and 
avoidance associated with social situations (e.g., "I often find social situations upsetting," 
"I try to avoid situations which force me to be very sociableyy). The SAD includes both 
Avoidance and Distress Subscales. 
The SAD possesses excellent internal consistency of r . 9 4  and adequate test-retest 
reliabililty (r.68) after a one month interval in a college student sample (Watson & 
Friend, 1969). With respect to the SAD'S validity, scores on the questionnaire have been 
found to be significantly related to global ratings of social skills obtained fiom peers (F- 
.70) and to specific behavioral measures of social skills, including gaze time cr--.34), 
speech latency (~ .48) ,  and number of words spoken (r.-3 1) during social interaction 
tests (Arkowitz, Lichtenstein, McGovern, & Hines, 1975). In addition, SAD scores 
correlate significantly with other measures of social anxiety (Wallander, Conger, Mariotto, 
Curran, & Farrell, 1980). 
The SAD'S avoidance subscale was employed in the current study as a measure of 
social avoidance due to social-evaluative concerns. 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-State Scale (STAI-Form Y; Spielberger, 1983). 
The STAI is a 2-scale, 40-item, self-report questionnaire assessing two forms of anxiety. 
The first subscale, State Anxiety, is conceptualized as a temporary emotional state 
characterized by subjective tension, apprehension, nervousness, and physiological arousal. 
State Anxiety is thought to vary in response to external stressors. In contrast, Trait 
Anxiety is conceptualized as a stable, individual propensity to experience anxiety in the 
face of stresshl situations. Both subscales require the respondent to rate the intensity of 
subjective anxiety (e.g., "I feel frightened") by utilizing a 4-point likert rating system 
(l="not at all" to 4="very much so"). Whereas the State Anxiety Subcale solicits self- 
report of how the individual feels "at a particular moment in time," the Trait Anxiety 
Subscale solicits selt-report of how a respondent "generally feels." 
Both the State and Trait Anxiety Subscales demonstrate high internal consistency 
(alpha=.90 or higher) for both psychiatric and normal samples (Spielberger, 1988). In 
addition, test-retest reliabiities for the Trait Subscale range from r . 7 3  to r .86,  indicating 
that this scale measures a stable construct. In contrast, test-retest reliabilities for the State 
Subscale are low, which is to be expected for a scale which is theorized to assess changes 
in anxiety in response to situational stress (Spielberger, 1988). The construct validity of 
the Trait Subscale has been demonstrated by significantly higher scores for psychiatric 
patient samples as compared to normal samples (Spielberger, 1983). Moreover, studies 
finding changes in State Anxiety scores in response to situational stress lend support to the 
construct validity of the State Subscale (Spielberger, 1983, 1984). 
The STAI-S was included as a measure in the present study in order to ensure that 
the stress induction procedure was successll in eliciting anxiety and to examine the 
hypothesis that increased anxiety is related to increased vigilance for threat cues presented 
subliminally, and strategic avoidance of threat cues presented supraliinally. 
Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1988). The BDI-11 
is a 21-item, self-report measure of depression severity. The psychometric properties of 
the BDI-II have been extensively investigated in both psychiatric and normal populations. 
Steer and colleagues (1985) studied the internal consistency of the BDI-11, noting mean 
coefficient alphas of .87 for both psychiatric and normal samples. In a review of the test- 
retest reliability of the BDI-11, Beck and colleagues (1988) noted that Pearson product- 
moment correlations ranged fiom .48 to -86 for psychiatric samples and fiom .60 to .90 
for nonpsychiatric samples depending on the length of the time interval between 
administrations. 
With respect to the concurrent validity of the BDI-11, Beck and colleagues (1988) 
reported high correlations between scores on the measure and clinical ratings of 
depression for both psychiatric ( ~ . 7 2 )  and nonpsychiatric (r.60) samples. Moreover, 
scores on the questionnaire correlate with measures of hopelessness, suicidal ideation, and 
depressogenic thoughts (Beck et al., 1988). In addition, the BDI-11's discriminant validity 
has been demonstrated by its ability to successfidly differentiate normal fiom clinical 
samples (Steer et al., 1986). 
The BDI-11 was included in the current study as a measure of severity of comorbid 
depression. Previous research has indicated that individuals suffering with depression do 
not exhibit a selective processiig bias for negatively valenced material, although they do 
exhibit a strong explicit memory advantage for negative information. These findings 
would imply that the cognitive biases associated with depression operate on a strategic, 
rather than an automatic, level of processing. Thus, BDI-11 scores allowed for the 
statistical examination of inhibitory effects of comorbid depression on selective attention 
for threat. 
Emotional Stroop Color-Naming Task (Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Stroop, 
1935). The Emotional Stroop color-naming task employed in the current study is a 
revised version of the original Stroop color-naming task (Stroop, 193 5). The Stroop 
procedure was performed on an IBM-compatible personal computer, using E-Prime 
software language (Psychology Software Tools, Inc., 2000) to control stimulus 
presentation and to record response latencies. Instructions were presented verbally and on 
the computer screen, stating that the task is a measure of "how people see events in their 
environment" (Holle et al., 1997). Participants were asked to quickly and accurately name 
the color in which individual words were presented to the center of the computer screen 
while ignoring the meaning of the word. 
Two sets of stimulus words were prepared for the pre- and post-induction Stroop 
tasks (Appendix B). Each set contained four types of stimulus words: social threat words, 
physical threat words, semantically-related neutral words (household items), and 
semantically-unrelated neutral words. The word sets were matched for word length and 
frequency of usage in the English language (Caroll, Davies, & Richman, 1971). In a pilot 
study, 47 undergraduates were asked to rate on a Likert scale (i.e., Wnot  at all 
emotional" to 5="very emotional") the intensity of emotion elicited by a preliminary list of 
stimulus words (Appendix B). These data were used to match the final word sets on the 
factor of emotional valence. 
Word presentation and recording of response latencies were controlled via a voice- 
activated relay through a microphone clipped to the participant's shirt. The individual's 
vocal response terminated each trial and initiated the next one. Responses were recorded 
via audiotape for later coding of errors in color-naming. 
Initially, participants were asked to color-name the words "one," "two," "three," 
and "four" presented individually on the monitor screen in the colors red, blue, green and 
yellow. This presentation provided a check for color blindness and ensured proper naming 
of colors. Second, a practice color-naming trial consisting of 5 unrelated neutral words 
which were not included in the experimental trials was presented. Each of the words was 
presented twice: once subliminally and once supraliminally. Finally, participants began the 
&st experimental phase, which consisted of 256 color-naming trials. 
During the pre- and post-induction experimental trials, each of the 32 stimulus 
words was shown twice in the unmasked condition and twice in the masked condition. 
Consistent with past research (MacLeod & Hagan, 1992) the color used in each trial was 
randomized, with the stipulation that for every participant, 25% of trials in each of the two 
exposure conditions was presented on each of the four possible background ink colors and 
no word appeared on the same color block more than once. In the unmasked exposure 
condition, a trial consisted of the presentation of an uppercase, 30 point, black stimulus 
word shown on an equivalent-sized rectangular color block at a central screen location. 
The word remained on the screen until the participant's verbal response triggered the 
voice key which, in turn, cleared the screen In the masked condition, a trial also began 
with the presentation of a black stimulus word on a color block to a central screen 
location. However, the word remained on the screen for duration of 20 rnsec, after which 
it was replaced by a pattern mask consisting of an equivalent-length string of black Xs. 
The pattern mask and color block remained on the screen until the participant's verbal 
response triggered the voice key, again clearing the screen. Within each experimental 
phase, the controlling software program presented the word set in masked format, 
followed by in unmasked fbrmat. Within each format, word types were presented in a 
hlly randomized order. 
Awareness Checks. In order to gauge the success of the masking procedure in 
preventing awareness of the meaning of the stimulus words, four blocks of "awareness 
checl? trials were included in each of the experimental phases. The trials consisted of 
having the participant decide whether a series of 16 briefly-presented (20 msec), masked 
letter strings were words or non-words (Appendix C). Only half of the letter strings were, 
in fact, words. Thus, chance levels of pedormance on the discrimination task (e.g., 50% 
correct), would suggest that the meaning of the masked stimulus words could not be 
consciously perceived. 
Procedure 
Participant Selection. All individuals who met initial entrance criteria with respect 
to questionnaire responses (see Participants) were contacted by telephone and asked a 
series of short questions regarding the study exclusion criteria (Appendix D). Those who 
appeared to meet inclusion criteria (no current panic attacks, psychotropic medications, or 
color-blindness) were invited to the Psychological Services Center (PSC) in order to 
participate in the study. Those who did not meet inclusion criteria were provided with a 
brief explanation for why they could not take part in the research project (e.g., 'We are 
seeking people who are not color-blind). 
Upon arrival at the PSC, the study coordinator escorted the participant to a private 
clinic room in order to explain the consent form (Appendix E). Participants were not 
given a detailed rationale for the study, but were informed that they would be taking part 
in a project about "how people feel about social situations" which involved completing a 
series of questionnaires and computer tasks. Interested students were asked to read and 
sign the consent form. 
As stated in the consent form, individuals were informed that they would not be 
required to undergo any unduly stressll procedures that are outside of those typically 
encountered in daily life or routine psychological testing. They were informed that they 
could become anxious at some point during the procedures and that, if they wished, they 
could terminate participation in the project at any time. They were informed that the study 
would take two hours to complete. 
Questionnaire Assessment. After signing the consent form, the participant was 
asked to complete a battery of questionnaires consisting of the SPAI, BDI, SADS, STAI- 
S, and FNE. Questionnaires were presented in a randomized order within groups in order 
to minimize any possible order effects. Participants were asked to read and follow each 
questionnaire's instructions carellly. 
Stroop Color-Naming; Tasks. Following completion of the questionnaire 
measures, participants were ushered to a separate room for completion of the emotional 
Stroop task. As described previously, the purpose of the Stroop task was to assess for 
selective attentional processing biases toward threatening information. Participants were 
seated within arm's reach of a computer monitor in a quiet, dimly lit room. Instructions 
were presented verbally and on the computer screen, stating that the task is a measure of 
"how people see events in their environment" (Holle et al., 1997). Standardized 
instructions asked that participants quickly and accurately name the color block on which 
individual words were presented to the center of a computer screen, while ignoring the 
meaning of the word. After completing a set of practice color-naming trials, participants 
completed the STAI-S and the experimental phase of the first Stroop task. 
After completing the first Stroop task, participants were told that they would 
shortly be going to another room in order to give a brieq 3-minute speech on a topic of 
their choosing to an audience of three graduate students (Amir et al., 1996). They were 
told that various aspects of the speech would be rated by the audience members. At this 
time, the STAI-S was re-administered in order to check the efficacy of the anxiety 
induction manipulation. Next, participants were told that prior to giving the speech, they 
would be completing a second Stroop task. The second Stroop task was identical in 
format to the first. However, a different set of word stimuli (Appendix B) was used in 
order to reduce priming effects. 
Debriefina. Subsequent to the completion of the aforementioned procedures, 
participants were thanked for their participation and were debriefed (Appendix F). The 
study coordinator provided participants with the necessary paperwork for them to obtain 
extra credit for their undergraduate psychology class. 
RESULTS 
Participant Characteristics 
Table 1 reports the demographic and clinical characteristics of the socially anxious 
and control groups. The two groups did not diier significantly with respect to sex, age, 
or receipt of current mental health treatment (e.g., counseling, psychotherapy). The 
socially anxious group scored signiticantly higher on measures of anxiety (SPAI-total, 
STAI-pre, STAI-post, FNE-total, SADS-total, LSAS-total) and depression (BDI-total) 
than did the control group. 
Table 1. Participant Demographic and Clinical Characteristics 
Characteristic 
Group 
Control Socially x2(1 ,621 
Anxious - F(1,62) 
n 3 1 3 1 
Sex ( F / M )  2318 22/9 .08 
Age 20.55 21 .25 .26 
Current Psychological Tx. (no tx.1t-x) 2912 2714 .74 
Anxiety Measures 
SPAI-total 20.86 91.65 144.39* 
LS AS-total 15.13 84.39 839.02* 
FNE-total 29.39 46.61 76.39* 
SADS-total 2.45 16.42 110.28* 
STAI-pre-induction 28.71 45.00 32.01* 
STAI-post-induction 30.79 61.30 145.02* 
Depression Measure 
Response to Induction Procedure 
In order to check the efficacy of the anxiety induction, each group's STAI-State 
scores before and after the anxiety manipulation were submitted to a 2 (Group: Socially 
Anxious, Control) x 2 (Time: Pre-, Post-Induction) Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with 
repeated measurement on the second factor. This analysis revealed significant main effects 
of Group, E(1, 120)--92.53, p<.0001, and Time, r(1, l20)=48.65, ~<.0001, that were 
modified by a significant interaction of Group x Time, E(l,l20)=25.87, p<.000 1. Simple 
main effects analysis revealed that participants had significantly higher STAI-S scores after 
the anxiety manipulation than before the anxiety manipulation, E(l,30)=20.84, Q<O 1. The 
increase in STAT-S scores exhibited by the control group was not significant, 
E(1,30)=4.39, B. Thus, the manipulation was successfbl in increasing subjective anxiety 
across both experimental groups. 
Stroop Color-Naming Task 
Color-identification latency data were excluded when participants made errors in 
color-naming or when latencies were less than 100 ms or more than 3 seconds (Mogg et 
al., 1992). Four participants were excluded because more than 10% of their data were 
lost due to errors or outliers. Thus, the final sample consisted of 62 participants and the 
mean percentage of lost data for these participants was 4.4% (4.3% and 4.5% for control 
and socially anxious groups, respectively). The mean color-naming latencies in each 
condition for both pre- and post-anxiety induction are given in Table 2. 
Initially, an exploratory repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
carried out for the whole data with Group (2: control, socially anxious) as a between- 
subjects variable and Time (2: pre-, post-induction), Exposure (2: subliminal, 
supralirninal), and Word Type (4: social threat, physical threat, categorized neutral, 
uncategoxized neutral) as within-subjects variables. The results showed a significant main 
effect for Time, E(1,976)=34.43, ~<.0001; latencies were slower post-induction 
w479.09)  than they were pre-induction @=539.58). There was also a significant main 
effect for Exposure, E(l,976)=49.43, p<.000 1; latencies were faster in the subliminal 
Table 2. Mean Color Naming Latencies in Milliseconds by Group for Pre- and Post- 
Induction Stroop Tasks 
Word Type 
Group 
Control Socially Anxious 
P r e - Post - P r e post 
M - M M M 
(SD) (SD) - (SD) - (SD) -
Supraliminal (Unmasked) Condition 
Social Threat 
Physical Threat 
Categorized Neutral 
Uncategorized Neutral 
(82.53) (105.21) 
Subliminal (Masked) Condition 
Social Threat 
Physical Threat 
Categorized Neutral 
Uncategorized Neutral 
(M=5 3 5.77) than the supraliminal (b=579.56) condition. In addition, a significant main 
effect of Group, E(1, 976p.13, g<.05, revealed slower latencies for the socially anxious 
group m477.44) than for the control group m437.89). Finally, a significant Group x 
T i e  interaction was found, E(1, 976)=10.79, gX.01, revealing a pattern of significantly 
slower latencies pre- to post-induction for the socially anxious group (pre-, W544.02; 
post-, M=610.86) than for the control group (pre-, M=535.14; post-, M=547.32). Further 
analyses of the latency data were hypothesis-driven and will be discussed in turn. 
Interference scores were calculated for each participant and exposure condition by 
subtracting the mean latencies for categorized neutral words fiom those for social threat 
words. Similarly, the physical threat interference score was calculated by subtracting the 
latencies for categorized neutral words fiom those for physical threat words. Larger 
intederence scores, for example, for social threat words, indicate that participants were 
relatively slower in color-naming anxiety-relevant words than neutral words. 
To test the h s t  hypothesis regarding the presence of a pre-attentive bias for 
threatening information in anxious individuals compared with normal controls, an 
ANOVA was carried out for intederence scores for subliminal words only across pre- and 
post-induction. The results confirmed the predicted group differences within the 
subliminal condition (main effect of Group; E(1,240)=4.12, g<.05). As demonstrated in 
Figure 1, the socially-anxious group showed relatively greater color-naming intederence 
for threat words in comparison with the control group across pre- and post-induction. 
The results fiom the subliminal condition support our h s t  hypothesis that there is a pre- 
attentive processing bias for threatening information in social anxiety. 
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Figure 1. Pre- and Post-Induction Mean Interference Scores for Subliminal Threat Words 
(Combined Physical and Social Threat) 
The second hypothesis concerned the content specificity of the bias. That is, is the 
processing bias in anxious individuals more evident for social-threat words than for 
physical threat words? The ANOVA of interference scores for threat words showed no 
evidence of an interaction between Group and Type of threat word, E(1,240)=.00, ns. or 
between Group, Wordtype, and Exposure, E(l,24O)=l.54, m. Thus, there was no 
evidence to support the notion of content specificity. 
The third hypothesis concerned the attentional pattern of the socially anxious 
under non-stressfid conditions. It was expected that the socially anxious individual's 
attentional bias would become more content-specific given the increased time to process 
the semantic meaning of the stimulus words. In other words, whereas the pre-attentive 
bias would be evident for all types of threatening information, the attentional bias would 
be specific to socially threatening information. An ANOVA of pre-induction interference 
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scores for supraliminally-presented words revealed a trend toward a main effect of Group, 
F(l, l20)=3.8 1, p=.06, and insignificant findings with respect to a main e f f i  of 
- 
Wordtype, F_(1,120)= 1.72, m, and a Group x Wordtype interaction, E(l,l20)=.03, ns (see 
Figure 2). 
Figure 2. Pre-Induction Mean Interference Scores for Supraliminal Threat Words 
Social Physical 
Threat Threat 
These results were contrary to what was predicted for two reasons. First, in the absence 
of stress, the socially anxious group demonstrated avoidance oS rather than the predicted 
vigilance toward, threatening information. Second, this avoidance was not specific to 
social threat words, but to both social and physical threat words. Thus, the attentional 
pattern of the socially anxious under non-stressfir1 conditions appears to be one of 
vigilance toward threatening information at early, non-conscious, automatic stages of 
processing, followed by avoidance of such information in later, conscious, strategic stages 
of processing (see Figure 3). 
Figure 3. Pre-Induction Mean Interference Scores for Threatening Words 
El SocAnx 
Sublim Supraiim 
The fourth hypothesis concerned the effects of the anxiety-induction procedure on 
interference for social threat words. It was hypothesized that, for the socially anxious 
group, the induction would result in facilitation of color-naming of social threat words 
presented subliminally and increased interference for those presented supraliminally (e.g., a 
vigilance-avoidance pattern). An ANOVA of post-induction interference scores for 
threatening words was carried out, with Group (2: socially anxious, control) as the 
between-subjects variable and Exposure (2: subliminal, supraliminal) and Wordtype (2: 
social threat, physical threat) as within-subject variables. The results showed no evidence 
of a Group x Exposure interaction, E(1,240)=.03, m, or main effects of Exposure, 
E(1,240)=.49, QS, or Wordtype, E(1,240)=.60, m. However, the main effect of Group 
approached significance, E(1,240)=3.29, r . 0 8  (see Figure 4). 
Figure 4. Post-Induction Mean Interference Scores for Threatening Words 
Sublim Supralim 
Under stress, the socially anxious group showed more interference for both types of threat 
words, regardless of exposure, than did the control group (e-g., a vigilance-vigilance 
pattern). The control group, however, demonstrated relative facilitation for threat words, 
regardless of exposure duration. 
In order to explore hypotheses regarding the relationship between Stroop 
performance and questionnaire measures of anxiety and depression, Pearson correlations 
were calculated between color-naming interference scores and SPAI, SADS, FNE, STAI- 
pre, STAI-post, and BDI. It was predicted that phobic fear and avoidance would be 
significantly and positively associated with a pre-attentive vigilance for threat words. 
Furthermore, these correlations were expected to be stronger post-induction. Consistent 
- 
with our prediction, SPAI total scores were positively associated with vigilance for 
subliminally-presented social threat words, but only after the anxiety induction ( r . 2 3 ,  
pC.05). Inconsistent with our prediction, none of the self-report measures of social fear 
and avoidance were found to correlate negatively with interference for supraliminal social 
threat words after initiation of the stress induction. State anxiety did not correlate 
significantly with any measure of color-naming interference. Although depression 
severity was not expected to correlate with any measure of attentional bias, BDI scores 
were positively associated with vigilance for subliminally presented social threat words 
after anxiety induction ( ~ . 2 7 9 ,  p<.05). 
A subsidiary question concerned the extent to which color naming interference 
effects are iduenced by word categorization. An ANOVA was carried out on color 
naming latencies for uncategorized and categorized neutral words, with Group (2: socially 
anxious, control) as a between subjects factor and Exposure (2: supraliminal, subliminal), 
T i e  (2: pre-, post-induction), and Categorization (2: categorized, uncategorized) as 
within-subjects variables (see Table 1 for means). There were no main effects or 
interactions involving the Categorization factor, suggesting that differences in response to 
physical or social threat words were not due to the effects of categorization (see Figure 5). 
Figure 5. Comparison of Color-Naming Latencies for Categorized and Uncategorized 
Word Stimuli (in Milliseconds) 
Awareness Checks 
Results of the awareness checks are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3. Awareness Check Results (Mean Percentage Correct on Each of Four Sets of 
Lexical Decision Tasks) 
Check 1 Check2 Check3 Check4 Total 
Socially Anxious @=3 1) 49.8 50.4 49.9 48.6 49.7 
Control @=3 1) 47.6 49.6 48.5 48.2 48.5 
Total Sample @=62) 48.7 50.0 49.2 48.4 49.1 
Across the four sets of lexical decision tasks, the mean percentages of trials with correct 
responses were 49.7% and 48.5% for the socially anxious and control groups, 
respectively. There was no sigdcant difference between the two groups in their 
performance as indicated by percentage correct scores, t(61)=-1.67, m. Additionally, 
there was no increase in accuracy over time. A paired samples t-test was carried out to 
assess the extent to which participants' percentage correct scores deviated fiom chance 
(50%). This showed that the overall performance of the sample @=.49, SD=.03) was not 
significantly different from that expected by chance, t_(6 1 P2.57, p<.05. Examining each 
awareness check separately, participant accuracy on the fist, &(61)=2.17, pC.05, and last 
set, 1(61)=2.01, pC.05 was sigdicantly worse than that expected by chance (48.7% and 
48.4%, respectively). These results suggest that the masking procedure was successll in 
preventing elaborate processing of the meaning of the stimulus words. 
Post-hoc Analyses 
Previous research indicates that individuals who suffer fiom depression tend not to 
exhibit attentional biases, but biases in later, more strategic stages of processing, such as 
memory. In order to investigate the hypothesis that participants' depressive symptoms 
may have impacted the general pattern of the attentional data, depression severity (total 
BDI score) was used as a covariate in a repeated measures ANOVA for the whole data. 
Once again, Group (2: control, socially anxious) was the between-subjects variable and 
Time (2: pre-, post-induction), Exposure (2: subliminal, supralirninal), and Word Type (4: 
social threat, physical threat, categorized neutral, uncategorized neutral) were the within- 
subjects variables. The general pattern of results was relatively unchanged. There were 
sigNf'icant main effects for Time, E(1,976)=8.79, p<.01, and Exposure, E(l,976)= 1 1.74, 
p<.OOl, however, there was no longer a main effect of Group, E(1,976)=2.461, m. The 
sigtllficant Group x Time, E(1,976)=7.67, p<.01, and Group x T i e  x Exposure, E(1, 
976)=4.07, p<.05, interactions remained. Thus, covariation of the fbctor of depression did 
not serve to strengthen, but rather somewhat weakened, the significance of the results. It 
should be noted, though, that the measure of depression severity used in the study, the 
BDI, correlated highly and significantly with each of the measures of anxiety, including the 
SPAI (F. 59, p<.OO 1), the FNE (F. 50, p<.001), the SADS (JF-68, p<.001), and the STAI 
(r.23, F.05). Thus, covariation of this variable probably did not serve the intended 
purpose of controlling for symptomatology unique to depression. 
DISCUSSION 
Principal Findings and Implications 
The current study yielded several interesting findings, both expected and 
unforeseen. First, as initially predicted, highly socially anxious individuals demonstrated 
greater interference with color-identification of threatening stimuli that were presented in a 
masked format. This was true both prior and subsequent to an anxiety induction 
procedure. The finding supports the hypothesis that social anxiety is associated with a 
bias for threatening information which operates at an automatic, pre-attentive stage of 
processing (Williams et al., 1997). That is, the attentional bias does not depend on 
conscious awareness of the threat stimuli. 
It is important to note that proof of sublirninality, or lack of awareness, is a 
complex and controversial issue. Cheesman and Merikle (1985) have made a distinction 
between subjective and objective thresholds of awareness. For example, when participants 
report that they are guessing in response to a forced-choice task, yet their performance is 
significantly above chance levels, they would be performing below the subjective 
threshold, but above the objective threshold. When actual performance on the task is no 
better than chance, participants are performing below objective thresholds of awareness. 
In the present experiment, the more stringent standard of objective threshold was used. 
Awareness checks requiring participants to decide whether masked stimuli were words or 
non-words were presented at four points during the experiment. During each of these 
awareness checks, participant accuracy was never significantly better than chance levels. 
Thus, the results of present experiment provide convincing evidence that color naming 
intederence effects due to the threatening emotional meaning of words in socially anxious 
individuals occur even when their abiity to detect the stimuli are at chance level, or below 
the objective threshold. In addition, perceptual processing of word meaning can occur 
without awareness, as defined by an objective threshold standard. 
The second finding was that, at automatic levels of attentional processing, this bias 
was not specific to social threat words, but extended to other types of threat as well. This 
iinding was consistent with prediction and suggests that interference effects occur when 
word stimuli have undergone a relatively superkid level of semantic analysis regarding 
their global negative emotional characteristics. It is consistent with previous investigations 
of pre-attentive bias in panic disorder, which found intederence for both physical threat 
words and social threat words (Lundh et al., 1999). From an evolutionary perspective, an 
attentional system that is sensitive to grossly threatening stimuli would be an adaptive 
survival mechanism. The emotion of fear likely evolved to enable an organism to detect 
and react swiftly to danger in its environment (LeDowr, 1996). Indeed, animal research to 
date has suggested that the brain's fear pathway and, in particular, the amygdala, is highly 
sensitive to a wide range of fear-relevant stimuli. A system that is adept at quickly 
perceiving grossly threatening environmental cues would theoretically have greater 
survival value than a visual-attentional system which is slower and reactive to a more 
restricted range of threatening stimuli. However, it should be noted that such a reactive 
attentional system would lose survival value if there were not a back-up system to ensure 
that the organism could disengage attention fiom cues which did not represent an 
immediate threat to its survival. This point will be addressed further in later discussion. 
The third finding concerned the attentional pattern of the socially anxious under 
non-stressful conditions. It was originally predicted that the preattentive bias for 
threatening information would give way to a more content specific bias (i.e., to social 
threat) with longer exposure durations and increased time for elaborate processing of the 
stimuli. This result would have been consistent with previous research in which 
individuals with social phobia displayed an attentional bias that was largely specific for 
supraliminally presented social threat words (Hope et al., 1990; Mattia et al., 1993). 
However, this was not reflected in the data. Contrary to prediction, under non-stressful 
conditions, the socially anxious group tended to avoid both social and physical threat 
words that were presented at intervals permitting conscious awareness. Thus, the pattern 
of attention of this group under non-stressful conditions was one of pre-attentive vigilance 
toward threatening information, followed by avoidance of threatening information in later, 
strategic stages of processing. This was the vigilance-avoidance pattern that was 
predicted for the post-induction phase. Interestingly, the control group demonstrated little 
to no bias for threat in pre-attentive stages of processing, but vigilance for threat in later 
stages of attentional processing. 
Two questions arise fiom these unexpected findings that warrant discussion. First, 
why was the attentional bias not speciiic to social threat? At first glance, this result 
appears incongruent with previous findings suggesting that interference effects are highly 
specific to the primary concerns of anxious patients (e.g., Mathews & MacLeoad, 1985; 
Mogg et al., 1989). However, these earlier results were obtained with a version of the 
Stroop featuring blocked presentation of stimulus words of the same semantic category. 
The blocked presentation may be more likely to elicit content-spdc interference effects 
because of increased opportunity for more elaborate processing of the semantic content of 
the word stimuli. In the present experiment, stimulus types were not blocked, but were 
randomly interspersed. This random presentation prevents elaborate processing from 
occurring, thus decreasing the risk of content-specific effects. In sum, when there is 
limited opportunity for elaborate processing of the stimuli to occur, the attentional bias of 
socially anxious individuals appears to operate in a nons@c manner for all types of 
threatening information. 
The second question pertains to why there was avoidance rather than the predicted 
vigilance toward threat in controlled stages of processing. It may be that, under 
conditions of low stress, the socially anxious are able to avoid cognitively, or rapidly 
disengage attention from, threat-related stimuli. Cognitive avoidance may be a coping 
strategy which serves the immediate purpose of keeping anxiety low. The control group, 
which did not demonstrate a preattentive bias toward threat, did not (need to) utilize such 
a strategy. 
The fourth finding concerns the effects of the anxiety-induction procedure on the 
bias for threatening information in the socially anxious group. It was originally 
hypothesized that, for the socially anxious group, the induction would result in a 
heightened pre-attentive bias for social threat words, followed by an avoidance of such 
cues when they are presented in exposure durations permitting semantic processing (i.e., a 
vigilance-avoidance pattern). Instead, the results suggested a vigilance-vigilance pattern, 
with the pre-attentive bias for threatening words remaining, but somewhat weakened, 
during later, conscious stages of attentional processing. Interestingly, the control group 
demonstrated avoidance of threatening material during preattentive and attentional 
processes following the stress-induction. 
When this study was first proposed, it was assumed that cognitive avoidance was a 
maladaptive coping mechanism in the sense that it would prevent objective evaluation ofl 
and habituation to, threat stimuli. However, the fourth finding calls this assumption into 
question and raises an alternative explanation. In fact, it may be that cognitive avoidance, 
or disengagement of attention fiom threat, is an adaptive strategy which functions to keep 
anxiety levels low during times of stress. Such a strategy was employed by the non- 
anxious control group in the present study. In contrast, the inability to disengage attention 
from threat would maintain cognitive resources on the source of stress and would serve to 
maintain or heighten anxiety states. Thus, the propensity to dwell on threat-related stimuli 
may engender feelings of anxiety and lead to the constant rumination and worry 
characteristic of clinical anxiety. It is interesting to note that, despite the fact that both 
experimental groups endorsed significant increases in state anxiety following the anxiety 
induction, the Stroop task revealed that they employed drastically different cognitive 
strategies in responding to threat stimuli under stressfkl conditions. 
An alternative explanation of attentiond dwell is that it represents a cognitive form 
of behavioral freezing (Fox, Russo, Bodes, & Dutton, 2001). When faced with a 
predator or other source of threat, fieezing prevents unnecessary movements that may 
trigger attack. LeDoux (1996) has described freezing as an evolutionary gift designed to 
increase an animal's chance of survival under threatening circumstances. Interestingly, 
there is some evidence that the arnygdala, which is a mediator of the fear reaction in 
humans, is also a mediator in the freezing behavior of animals (Fanselow 1994; Armony & 
LeDoux, 2000). Thus, prolonged engagement of attention by threat cues may represent a 
vestige of a once-adaptive fear response. Future investigations are needed to test this 
hypothesis. 
With respect to the relationship between self-reported fear and performance on the 
Stroop, few of the initial predictions bore fiuit. Consistent with initial hypotheses, there 
was a significant, positive correlation between scores on the SPA1 and a pre-attentive bias 
for social threat words after the anxiety induction. However, contrary to prediction, 
scores on the BDI were also found to correlate positively with post-induction pre- 
attentive bias for social threat words. Consistent with the latter hding, when the factor of 
depression severity was covaried out of the Stroop analyses, the significance of the 
findings was weakened. This was a somewhat surprising result and appears inconsistent 
with the Williams et al. (1997) theory that depression is not associated with automatic 
attentional biases. However, it should be noted that diagnoses of depression were not 
made in the current study, and it is possible that the BDI is an inexact measure of 
depression in that its scores may be sensitive to inflation by anxiety symptoms. This is 
supported by the fact that the BDI correlated highly and sigmfkantly with each of the 
measures of anxiety. Another factor which may have served to weaken the correlational 
results is the fact that the design of the current study, which features samples which are 
stratitied by the factor of social anxiety, is not ideal for correlational analyses. If the study 
used a unified sample of individuals representative of the 1 1 1  range of social anxiety, 
perhaps there would have been greater power to detect correlational relationships. 
However, such a design would not have suited the primary objectives of this study. A 
third explanation of the weakness of the correlations is that Stroop performance may, in 
fact, have little relationship to self-reported anxiety. If measures of attention represent a 
purer measure of vulnerability to anxiety, impervious to the demand-effects and response 
biases of questionnaire measures, then correlations between the two measures would be 
expected to be poor. 
In sum, the current data suggest that the attentional patterns of the socially anxious 
differ fiom non-anxious controls and that these patterns are affected by exposure to stress 
induction. The data suggest that, in the absence of stress, the socially anxious sample was 
able to counteract a pre-attentive bias for threat through conscious efforts to avoid 
attending to the threatening stimuli. That is, they were able to disengage their attention 
fiom threat. However, once exposed to a stressor, it appears that they were unable to use 
strategic processes to disengage their attention fiom thrdt. The non-anxious control 
participants, however, exhibited a drastically different pattern of attention. Under 
conditions of stress, they appeared to exhibit a preattentive bias against processing threat, 
which continued in later, strategic stages af attention. This tendency to disengage fiom 
prolonged processing of threat may be an adaptive mechanism aimed at preventing a "fight 
or fight" response. 
Methodological Weaknesses 
Both general methodological weaknesses and the limitations of the Stroop task in 
particular will be discussed in turn. With respect to general methodological weaknesses, it 
would have been preferable to utilize an experimental group composed of individuals 
diagnosed with social anxiety disorder. However, given restrictions in time and resources, 
it was not possible to recruit fiom the community and to administer a diagnostic interview 
to potential participants. Such a process would have allowed for increased generalizability 
ofthe study results to a clical population. In addition, it would have permitted the 
exclusion of individuals with significant psychiatric comorbidity that may have iduenced 
attentional processing. Thus, theoretically, it may have been possible to isolate and 
observe the attentional patterns associated with uncomplicated social anxiety disorder. 
Use of a clinical sample, in combination with a larger sample size, may have served to 
increase the robustness of our findings. 
In defense of the recruitment strategies utilized in the current study, every effort 
was made to identlfL an undergraduate sample with relatively extreme social fears. Their 
scores on the screening questionnaire were at least 1.5 standard deviations above the mean 
of their undergraduate peers. The experimental sample demonstrated mean performance 
on questionnaire measures of social anxiety (e.g., SPAI, SADS) which was comparable to 
that seen in clinical samples cited in the literature. Moreover, another powefil argument 
in Eavor of the use analogue samples involves the conceptualization of forms of 
psychopathology as continuous phenomena. If social anxiety is, indeed, a continuous 
variable, then clinical anxiety should differ from subclinical anxiety in quantity but not 
quality. Thus, an analogue sample of socially anxious individuals should demonstrate 
similar attentional patterns, albeit perhaps less robust, than a clinical sample. 
The current study was designed, in part, with the aim of addressing many of the 
methodological weaknesses of previous investigations of attentional processes using the 
Stroop color-naming task. A computerized version of the Stroop, versus the older card 
version, was used in order to standardize the presentation of stimuli across trials and 
across participants. Word stimuli were matched for the degree of emotion elicited, 
character length, number of syllables, and frequency of usage in the English language. The 
two sets of word control groups, also matched on the aforementioned variables, served to 
ensure that the semantic similarity of each group's words did not contribute to the 
observed attentional biases. Semantic priming was also reduced by presenting word-types 
in a random sequence rather than blocked by category. Furthermore, unlike the majority 
of previous Stroop investigations, the current study included periodic awareness checks in 
the Stroop protocol to serve as an internal check that participants were, indeed, unaware 
of the subliminally-presented material. 
Despite the aforementioned upgrades in Stroop methodology, the paradigm itself is 
several decades old and has come under increasing criticism in recent years. A 
fimdarnental weakness of traditional means of measuring attention such as the Stroop and 
dot-probe tasks is that they rely on cross-sectional  snapshot^^^ of attention at specific time 
points. Such paradigms measure attention at very specific moments in time, usually 
following the presentation of an emotional stimulus. However, by its nature, attention is a 
fluid, continuous process characterized by constant shifts. In order to arrive at a more 
complete and accurate picture of attention, more sophisticated methods of assessing the 
fluidity of attention over longer time periods are needed. 
One paradigm with potential utility as a continuous index of attention is the 
registration of eye movements. In this paradigm, eye movements are continuously 
monitored for several seconds using an eye-tracking device which sends an in£iared beam 
of light to one of the eyes of the participant. Part of the light is reflected by the cornea 
and part is reflected through the pupil by the retina. An infiared sensitive camera records 
these reflections and, on the basis of the images, computes a vector between the pupil 
center and corneal reflection. The fixation point is the intersection of the two moving 
axes. Eye movement registration was utilized recently in an effort to measure the viewing 
patterns of spider-phobic participants toward emotionally relevant (i.e., spiders) or 
irrelevant (i.e., flowers) stimuli (Hermans, Vansteenwegen, & Eelen, 1999). The 
investigators found that spider-phobic participants initially oriented toward pictures of 
spiders relative to flowers, when stimuli were presented for durations up to 500 ms. 
However, when exposure to the stimulus continued beyond 500 ms, there was a strong 
tendency for spider phobics to shift their gaze away from the spider-related pictures. This 
pattern was not observed in the control group and suggests that initial dwell time on 
threatening stimuli gives way to selective avoidance of such stimuli at longer durations. 
Future research with such paradigms will greatly improve our knowledge of the fluidity of 
the attentional system. 
Recent Developments 
In recent years, the area of attention has benefited from advances in technology 
and an attenuation of the schism between pure cognitive research and clinical research. 
Increasingly, clinical researchers in this area are incorporating in their investigations 
technology that is considered state-of-the-art by the standards of pure cognitive research. 
Such cross-disciplinary study is, undoubtedly, a promising development and will likely 
quickly advance our knowledge of how complex attentional processes contribute to 
psychopathology. 
Very recently, an article by such a group of cross-disciplinary investigators has 
revolutionized the conceptualization of attentional bias (Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 
2001). This article warrants thorough discussion in that its proposals influence the 
interpretation of the results of the current study. In essence, the authors challenged the 
popular notion that Stroop interference is due to a bias in the initial orientation of attentive 
resources toward threat-related stimuli. They argue that threat-related material instead 
affects "attentional dwell time," or the ability to disengage attentional resources fiom 
threatening stimuli in anxious people. They note that the emotional Stroop and dot-probe 
tests are not apt measures of attentional shift because the information to be ignored is 
always presented within foveal vision. Although foveal vision and attention are not the 
same thing, there is a consensus in cognitive psychology that it is impossible not to attend 
to information presented within a 1 degree radius fiom fixation (e.g. Ericksen & Eriksen, 
1974; Treisrnan, 1969 as cited in Fox et al., 200 1). Therefore, with both Stroop and dot- 
probe tasks, it is impossible to determine whether the threatening information draws 
attention or whether, once detected, threatening information holds attention. Both 
processes would be reflected in longer color-naming latencies on the Stroop task. 
In a series of studies, Fox and colleagues investigated the notion of attentional 
dwell time using a paradigm that more directly measured attentional disengagement (Fox 
et al., 2001,2002). In their investigations, a threat-related or neutral word cue is 
presented alone for a very brief period in one of two possible locations. A target could 
then appear in either a validly cued location (i.e., cue and target appear in the same 
location) or an invalidly cued location (i.e., cue and target appear in different locations). 
The invalidly cued trials are of particular interest, since reaction times can be compared 
following neutral, positive, and threat-related cues, yielding a more direct measure of 
disengagement fiom threatening stimuli. If threatening material increases dwell time in 
anxious participants, this should be reflected in slower reaction times to detect a target on 
invalid trials following a threat-related cue, relative to a positive or neutral one. In a series 
of studies using schematic facial expressions and photographs of real facial expressions as 
cues, Fox et al. (2001) found that individuals with high levels of state anxiety took longer 
to respond to a target on invalid trials when the cue had been an angry facial expression. 
Low state anxiety individuals did not show this pattern. Both Fox and colleagues (2002) 
and Yiend and Mathews (in press; as cited in Fox et al., 2002) have since found a similar 
pattern of results in high trait anxious participants. These findings argue against the idea 
that anxiety is characterized by a hypervigrlance of the attentional system or a bias in the 
shifting of attention (Eysenck, 1992) but, rather, a problem with disengaging attention 
fiom threatening information in the environment. Fox and colleagues' recent data are 
convincing and have been considered landmark by many investigators who are involved in 
the study of attentional processing. Their implications for the interpretation of the current 
study's results will be discussed presently. 
From the perspective of Fox and colleagues, attention is best conceptualized as a 
fluid process, but one involving various stages including shifting, engagement, and 
disengagement (Posner & Petersen, 1990). The sh&g component is thought to be an 
encapsulated system that is not affkcted by higher level cognitive influences. Because 
shifting of attention is considered to be a reflexive action, the speed of orientation to novel 
cues in the environment is not thought to be affkcted by the meaning or valence of the cue. 
This would be an adaptive feature of an attentional system fiom the standpoint of 
facilitating quick and accurate perception of changes in the environment. However, an 
additional function of attentional systems is to maintain processing resources on relevant 
stimuli. Stimulus relevance may be determined both by characteristics of the scene itself' 
and by the expectations, beliefs, and goals of the observer (Yantis, 1996). Thus, stages 
beyond the shifting of attention are thought to be influenced by higher level variables. 
According to Fox and colleagues, attentional biases occur subsequent to the initial shifting 
and amount to an inabiity to disengage attention fiom certain types of stimuli. 
There is some evidence to suggest that there is a biological basis for fear-relevant 
stimuli (e.g., snakes, spiders, angry faces) to be given precedence by the attentional 
system. Indeed, psychophysiological studies show that the conditioning of autonomic 
responses to such stimuli is much easier than to fear-irrelevant stimuli such as flowers 
(Ohman & Soares, 1998). With respect to the present study, this biological vestige or 
predisposition may account for why the attentional systems of anxious individuals are 
hypersensitive to the fear-relevant stimuli in the environment. Furthermore, these 
attentional biases may underlie the other types of cognitive biases observed in clinical 
anxiety. Data fiom the present study lend some preliminary support to the Fox's notion 
that the socially anxious have difficulty disengaging fiom threat cues. When exposed to a 
stressor, the socially anxious group was unable to use strategic processes to disengage 
their attention fiom threat, while the control participants were able to disengage attention 
fiom such cues. The result of this apparent inability to disengage attention fiom social 
threat cues may be gross overestimations of the threat of disapproval fiom others. 
Furthermore, such a process may ensure that cognitive resources are shunted away fiom 
cues relevant to successll task performance, thus leading to impoverished performance in 
social situations. 
Future Directions 
With continued improvements in methodologyltechnology, measures of attentional 
deployment have potential utility in the clinical setting. Such procedures could be used 
diagnostically, as measures of emotional vulnerability. That is, they may be useful in 
predicting who is and who is not susceptible to developing anxiety problems or extreme 
emotional reactions to stressors. For example, knowledge of an individual's information 
processing style during childhood could be used to predict risk of subsequent development 
of anxiety disorders in adolescence or adulthood. The same process could apply to 
determining one's risk of developing PTSD after exposure to a traumatic event. 
As an assessment tool, information processing measures would be superior to 
questionnaire measures in the sense that they are not susceptible to demand effects or 
intentional distortion. Whereas, on self-report measures, patients may exaggerate or 
minimize changes in symptoms to please the therapist or to prevent termination, this 
would not be possible on the measures of involuntary attention. It has already been 
established that clinically si@cant improvements in social phobia symptoms following 
treatment with cognitive-behavioral therapy or phenelzine are associated with decreases in 
the bias for social threat cues that are presented at intervals permitting conscious 
awareness (Mattia et al., 1993). However, investigations have yet to reveal whether 
treatment affects automatic, preconscious processing biases. Residual information 
processiig biases following a course of treatment, in fact, may be predictive of subsequent 
relapse and could signal the need for additional treatment. These questions have yet to be 
examined empirically, however, and future research should address the potential utility of 
attentional measures as an assessment tool and a means of quantdjmg treatment 
effectiveness. 
One area in which the utility of attentional measures has been investigated is as a 
treatment apparatus. Masia and colleagues (Masia, McNeil Cohn, & Hope, 1999) used 
the Stroop as a language-based means of exposing individuals to social threat cues (e.g., 
words such as "speech" and "conversation"). They likened the procedures to imaginal 
exposure in that patients were not placed in feared situations, but were exposed to word 
stimuli that had become associated with those situations and, thus, had acquired the ability 
to elicit fear. They present preliminary data indicating that exposure therapy using brief 
presentations of social threat cues is effective in reducing social fears. The authors argue 
that exposure using the Stroop holds promise as a preliminary or adjunctive treatment for 
the socially anxious as a means of reducing anxiety prior to undertaking group cognitive- 
behavioral therapy and in-vivo exposure exercises. 
In the immediate future, it would seem prudent to focus research pursuits on 
developing a clearer picture of what the attentional bias represents and what is its 
relationship to observable aspects of anxiety. Traditional measures such as the Stroop 
offer only a ghpse  at this phenomenon, however, the newly developed paradigms 
previously discussed will undoubtedly provide a more complete and accurate view of the 
fluid nature of the attentional process. Furthermore, at this point in time, researchers can 
only speculate about the origins of the bias and its biological substrates. Moreover, it is 
stil l unclear as to how such a bias contributes to the development or maintenance of the 
behavioral avoidance characteristic of anxiety disorders. Future cross-disciplinary 
research in cognitive-behavioral psychology, neuropsychology, and clinical neurobiology 
may shed some light on these questions. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
Informed Consent I 
Screen # 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this brief questionnaire. Please sign and print 
your name below, along with your telephone number or e-mail address. This is to say that 
you are at least 18 years old, you give your consent to complete the attached 
questionnaire, and you understand that you do not receive research credit for completing 
this questionnaire. In addition, your signature indicates that you are interested in 
participating in a related study, and that you give permission for an experimenter to 
contact you by telephone or e-mail to set up a time for you to participate in a voluntary 
study. The experimenter is looking for participants who score in various ranges on the 
questionnaires, so you may or may not be contacted to participate in the study. The study 
is entitled "Attitudes and Reactions to Social Situations" and involves completing a set of 
questionnaires and a computer task. 
If you have any questions you may contact Kristin Maki, 166 Little Hall, phone: 58 1 - 
203 1. Thanks again for your help. 
Signature Age Gender 
Name (please print) Phone Number 
E-mail address 

Appendix C 
Table C 1. Awareness Check Stimuli Sets 
Check 1 Check 2 Check 3 Check 4 
work #letters words #letters 
8 
ignorant 8 
mbulance 9 cancer 5 
illness 7 insane 6 , trapped 7 coffin 6 
microwave 9 vase 4 furnished 9 mantelpiece 11 
bookcase 8 upstairs 8 towel 5 Staircase 9 
obsidian 
non-words 
levofmr 
omwrn 
8 
8.00 
sltwmep 7 arpaltid 8 getaser 7 sliban 6 
rhayxd 6 cirne 5 wuzilter 8 umtar 5 
dsivamiru 9 lorpien 7 telignoffer 11 holgracten 10 
# letters 
7 
8 
# letters 
7 
6 
network 
non-words 
cepran 
hipresmalt 
non-words 
mopecer 
gatricep 
7 
6.38 
- --- 
# letters 
6 
10 
demonstrate 
non-wds 
tordrane 
culpaser 
# letters 
8 
8 
11 
8.25 
handwriting 11 
7.88 
Appendix D 
Telephone Screening Transcript 
Screen # 
My name is Kristin Maki and I am a graduate student in the psychology department. I recently spoke to 
your undergmduate psychology class about my research project about attitudes and reactions to social 
situations. You had a@ to complete a screening questionnaire and to be contacted if you met initial 
study criteria. Based upon your responses, you may be eligible to participate in the study. However, I 
would need to ask you some additional questions about your mental health and medical history. Would 
you mind answering some questions? (yes 1 no) 
1.) Are you currently taking medication for, or participating in therapy for, problems with anxiety or 
depression? (yes I no) [If no, skip to question 2.1 
[If yes...] Unfortunately, we are looking for participants who are not receiving medication treatment 
for difficulties with anxiety or depression. 
2.) Have you recently experienced panic attacks? A panic attack is a sudden rush of intense fear or 
discomfort, which may include such symptoms as heart palpitations, sweating, shortness of breath, feeling 
faint, and a fear of dying or losing control. (yes I no) [If no, skip to question 3 .] 
[If yes. ..I In what types of situations do these attacks occur? 
Are you worried about having another attack? (yes I no) [If yes, go to **] 
3.) Have you been feeling depressed or have you lost interest or pleasure in nearly all of your usual 
activities? (yes I no) [If no, skip to question 4.1 
[If yes...] Have you experienced other symptoms, such as significant changes in weight, or appetite; 
sleep difficulties; restlessness or feeling slowed down; fatigue or lo& of energy; feelings of 
worthlessness or guilt; inability to concentmte; or thoughts about death or suicide? (yes I no) [If 
yes, go to **I 
[**Ifthe client endorses recurrent, unexpected panic attacks or depression..] It sounds as though you may 
be baving some difficulties with anxietyldepression Unfortunately, this would make you ineligible to 
participate in the research project However, if you would like to obtain treatment, the University of 
Maine has a Counseling Center at Cutler Health Center. If you would like to call them, their number is 
581-1392 (on nights or weekends, their crisis number is 581-4020).] 
4.) Are you color blind? (yes 1 no) 
[If yes ...I Unfortunately, because of the type of computer tasks we are using in the study, you 
would be ineligible to participate. 
[If no.. .] Based on your answers to these questions, you would be eligible to participate in the 
study. Would you like to set up an appointment time in order to come in, hear more about the 
study and, perhaps, participate? (yes I no) 
Appendix E 
Informed Consent 
Participant # 
I have been asked to participate in a study entitled "Attitudes and Reactions to Social 
Situations" because I am at least 18 years old and have met initial study entry criteria 
based on my previous responses on a screening questionnaire. The procedures used in this 
study involve completing a set of questionnaires and computer tasks. The questionnaires 
measure levels of anxiety and depression, and include such items as, "I feel anxious before 
entering a social situation," and "I feel sad much of the time." I€ any of the questions are 
disturbing or upsetting to me, I may leave them blank. The computer tasks involve 
quickly identifjllng the color in which various words are presented on a monitor. The 
study requires approximately two hours to complete and I will receive two credit-hours to 
apply to my undergraduate psychology course grade. I understand that my participation is 
voluntary and that I may terminate participation at any point without penalty. 
Risk&enefits 
All of the information that I provide will be kept codidential and separate fiom identifling 
information. Questionnaires will be identified by code number only. No information that 
could identifj. me will ever be released. Only group information will be reported. 
Furthermore, all of the information that I provide will be stored in a locked laboratory. 
One risk of participating in this study is that I may feel uncomfortable or anxious at some 
point during the questionnaire or computer procedures. However, I will not be required 
to undergo any unduly stressful procedures that are outside of those typically encountered 
in daily life or routine psychological testing. The potential benefits of the study include 
learning more about both people's attitudes and reactions to social situations and the 
experience of participating in a research project. As a result of my participation, I will 
also obtain 2 hours worth of research credit to apply to my undergraduate psychology 
course grade. 
This study is being conducted by Kristin Maki, B. A, and supervised by Jefiey E. Hecker, 
PhD. If I have any questions, comments or concerns, I may contact Kristin Maki at 301 
Little Hall, Department of Psychology, Orono, Maine 04469,58 1-203 1 or Dr. Hecker at 
341 Corbett Hall, Orono, Maine, 04469-5717,58 1-2065. 
I have read and understood the contents of this consent form. I have been given a copy of 
this form. 
Participant's Signature: Date: 
Appendix F 
Debriefing Statement 
The purpose of the research study that you have just completed was to investigate the 
relationship between social anxiety and one's propensity to attend to social threat cues in 
hidher environment. You were invited to participate because you scored either high or 
low on a screening questionnaire which measures level of anxiety in social situations (i.e., 
meeting other people, parties, etc.). The purpose of the computer tasks was to see 
whether your attention was drawn to words denoting social threat (i.e., embarrass, 
speech), making it more time-consuming for you to color-name them. It was necessary 
for us to tell you that you would be required to give a speech in order for us to examine 
whether the anxiety produced by the request (if any) had an effect on your attention to 
specific types of words. 
We are requesting that you please do not share this information with others who are likely 
to participate in this study. Having detailed knowledge about the purpose of the study 
may affect the way that they respond to the questionnaires or other procedures. 
If, in the future, you have any questions or comments about the study, please feel free to 
contact the study coordinator, Kristin Maki, B.A. at 301 Little Hall, Department of 
Psychology, Orono, Maine 04469, 581-2031 or her supervisor, Jeffrey E. Hecker, Ph.D. 
at 34 1 Corbett Hall, Orono, Maine, 04469-57 17,58 1-2065. 
Thank you very much for your participation. 
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